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Abstract
My thesis consists of three chapters: two chapters on the effects of financial shocks, and one
on the relationship between external debt and economic growth in low- and middle-income
countries.
Chapter 1, “Financial Shocks, Interbank Rates and Corporate Rates”, introduces financial
shocks that change interbank and corporate debt rates and their spread and shows how these
shocks affect economic fluctuations.
Chapter 2, “Tighter Debt Limits, Default, and Labour Supply”, shows that the effect of
tighter debt limits on households' labour supply decisions depends on whether default is
allowed or not.
Chapter 3, “External Debt, Initial Conditions, and Economic Growth in Low- and MiddleIncome Countries”, looks at the external debt-growth relationship from a new angle and
shows that where an economy starts relative to its long-run average output per capita affects
the direction of this relationship.

Keywords
Financial Shocks, Economic Fluctuations, Hours Worked, Bankruptcy Filings,
External Debt, Economic Growth.
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Summary for Lay Audience
Companies rely on debt as a source to fund their operations. Consequently, it is expected that
the cost of debt affects firms’ decisions, like hiring and production. The rates paid on many
corporate debt instruments are based on benchmark rates like interbank rates. Interbank rates
are interest rates paid by financial institutions (banks) when borrowing from each other. This
suggests that the interplay between corporate debt and interbank rates may have wider
implications on the economy by affecting firms’ decisions and activities.
Therefore, in Chapter 1, I study the movement of interbank and corporate debt rates, then I
ask how do changes in these rates and their spread (the difference between them) affect
economic fluctuations? I find that changes in these rates and their spread can generate
economic fluctuations like what is observed in the United States (US) in the past few
decades. This highlights the importance of fluctuations in the financial sector as a source of
wider economic fluctuations.
Further, changes in the financial sector can affect households’ decisions by affecting their
ability to borrow. During the financial crisis that started in 2007, it became more difficult to
borrow from banks in the US and elsewhere. Meanwhile, there was an increase in bankruptcy
filings and a decrease in hours worked in the US.
Therefore, in Chapter 2, I ask how does tightening debt limits affect households’ labour
supply decisions when they are allowed to file for bankruptcy? I find that following a
decrease in debt limits, households who file for bankruptcy decrease their hours worked. If
they were not allowed to file for bankruptcy, they increase their hours worked.
Like firms and households, countries require funds. In low- and middle-income countries,
external debt is an important source of funding. World Bank data show that external debt
increased significantly in this group of countries since 1970.
In Chapter 3, I ask about the relationship between external debt and economic growth in lowand middle-income countries and look at this relationship from a new angle. I find that when
an economy starts with income per person lower than its long-run average, external debt is
more likely to be positively related with economic growth.
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Preface
My thesis consists of three chapters: two chapters on the effects of financial shocks, and one
on the relationship between external debt and economic growth in low- and middle-income
countries. Chapter 1, “Financial Shocks, Interbank Rates and Corporate Rates”, introduces
financial shocks that change interbank and corporate debt rates and their spread and shows
how these shocks affect economic fluctuations. Chapter 2, “Tighter Debt Limits, Default, and
Labour Supply”, shows that the effect of tighter debt limits on households' labour supply
decisions depends on whether default is allowed or not. Chapter 3, “External Debt, Initial
Conditions, and Economic Growth in Low- and Middle-Income Countries”, looks at the
external debt-growth relationship from a new angle and shows that where an economy starts
relative to its long-run average output per capita affects the direction of this relationship.
In Chapter 1, I first study the movement of interbank rates and corporate debt rates relative to
GDP. I find that while interbank rates are procylical, corporate debt rates are countercyclical.
The spread between them is also countercyclical.
Debt instruments represent a significant source of funding for firms in the US. The rates on
many corporate debt instruments are based on a benchmark rate like an interbank rate. This
suggests that the interplay between corporate debt and interbank rates may have wider
macroeconomic implications.
Hence, in Chapter 1 I ask, how do shocks to the financial sector that change the spread
between corporate debt and interbank rates contribute to economic fluctuations? To answer
this question, I build on the model of Boissay et al. (2016) by adding shocks to the financial
sector (financial shocks) and a working capital loan required by a representative firm. I use
the model’s equilibrium equations along with data on the interbank and corporate debt rates
to estimate financial shocks.
Then, I simulate the model with productivity shocks only, financial shocks only, and both
types of shocks. Simulating the model with only productivity shocks fails to capture the
cyclicality of the interbank and corporate debt rates and their spread. In contrast, after adding

xii

financial shocks, model simulation generates a procylical interbank rate, a countercyclical
corporate debt rate, and a countercyclical spread, in line with data.
In addition, simulating the model with financial shocks generates the right sign of the
correlation between the spread and other macroeconomic variables (hours worked,
consumption, investment). Model simulation with only productivity shocks fails on that
aspect as well. Also, simulating the model with financial shocks generates volatility in hours
worked relative to GDP closer to data than simulating the model with only productivity
shocks. This highlights the importance of fluctuations in the financial sector as a source of
wider economic fluctuations.
Debt is also used by households to smooth consumption. During the financial crisis that
started in 2007, banks in the US and around the world tightened lending standards (Quadrini,
2011; Puri, et al.2011). Meanwhile, non-business bankruptcy filings almost doubled, and
hours worked decreased in the US.
Therefore, in Chapter 2, I ask how does tightening debt limits affect households’ labour
supply decisions when they are allowed to default versus when they are not allowed to
default? To answer the question, I build on the models from Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017)
and Fieldhouse et al. (2018). I find that following a decrease in debt limits, households who
find it optimal to default decrease their labour supply. If not allowed to default, they increase
their labour supply.
Like firms and households, countries require funds. In low- and middle-income countries,
external debt is an important source of funding. World Bank data show that the average
external debt to gross national income almost tripled since 1970 in this group of countries.
Empirical studies report mixed results on the relationship between external debt and
economic growth in this group of countries. In Chapter 3, I look at this relationship from a
new angle. I find that when a low- or middle-income economy starts with income per capita
lower than its long-run average, external debt is more likely to be positively related with
economic growth.

xiii

Then, I test whether a standard stochastic growth model with external borrowing can account
for this observation. I simulate the model with different levels of initial external debt, initial
output per capita and different productivity shock parameters. This is to reflect the
differences between low- and middle-income countries in their initial conditions. Simulated
data produce results in line with the observation that the lower the starting income per capita
relative to the long-run average, the more likely that external debt is positively related to
growth and vice versa.

xiv
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Chapter 1

1

Financial Shocks, Interbank Rates and Corporate Rates

1.1 Introduction
Corporate debt is an important source of finance for firms in the US. For example, Liu
and Magnan (2014) mention that US firms issued $13.5 trillion debt instruments
compared to less than $2 trillion equity instruments between 2003 and 2009. The rates
that firms pay on their debt is therefore expected to affect their economic decisions and
activities and as a result, aggregate economic activity.
Interbank market rates, like the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (Libor), have been used
as a benchmark to price corporate debt with floating rates. Mollenkamp and Whitehouse
(2008) mention that trillions of dollars of corporate debt and other financial instruments
have their rates “reset according to Libor” (p.2).
US data from Q1:1986 to Q4:2019 show that while interbank rates are procyclical,
corporate bond rates are countercyclical. The spread between the two is also
countercyclical. What does this imply for the overall economic fluctuations? In
particular, how do shocks to the financial sector that change the spread between corporate
and interbank rates affect economic fluctuations?
To answer this question, I build on the model of Boissay et al. (2016). The model has a
financial sector composed of heterogenous intermediaries. Intermediaries can borrow and
lend from each other, as well as provide loans to a representative firm. Intermediaries
vary in their intermediation efficiency, that is, the cost of providing a loan to the
representative firm. They also have an outside option in which they can invest and divert
funds. The latter gives rise to moral hazard. In addition, intermediaries do not know each
other’s types when lending to each other. Hence, the financial sector has two frictions:
moral hazard and asymmetric information. Moral hazard results in intermediaries putting
a limit (constraint) on how much they are willing to lend other intermediaries, in order to
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eliminate the incentive to divert funds. Asymmetric information results in having one
constraint in the interbank market, regardless of types since they are private information.
The model also has a representative profit-maximizing firm. It has been reported that on
average, firms in the US borrow 50% of their capital input costs and 43% of their labour
input costs (Phaneuf & Victor, 2017). I incorporate this to the model by assuming that the
representative firm needs to borrow different fractions of its input costs (capital and
labour) in advance before production takes place. Loans are provided by intermediaries
from the financial sector.
Finally, the model has a utility-maximizing representative household with an infinite
horizon. The representative household values consumption and leisure. It supplies labour
to the representative firm, supplies funds to intermediaries in the financial sector, and
accumulates capital.
There are two sources of disturbance to the economy. The first source is productivity
shocks. These shocks change the efficiency of the representative firm in converting
inputs to output, which is a standard assumption in the macroeconomic literature. The
second source is financial shocks. These shocks change the overall intermediation
efficiency of the financial sector. A negative financial shock makes it more costly to
provide a loan to the representative firm while a positive financial shock does the
opposite. Both types of shocks change the interbank borrowing limit, interbank rate, the
firm’s cost of borrowing, and the spread. Since the firm needs to borrow part of its
inputs’ cost each period, then these changes affect the firm’s optimal decisions and
therefore the aggregate economic activity.
My estimation of financial shocks is based on the model’s equilibrium equations. I use
the model’s equilibrium equations and data on 3-month Libor (3m Libor) and the average
of AAA and BAA corporate bond rates to construct a time series for a measure of the
financial sector’s overall intermediation efficiency. Then, I use the constructed time
series to estimate shocks to the efficiency of the financial sector (i.e. financial shocks). I
repeat the estimation using 12-month Libor (12m Libor) and the effective federal funds
rate (FF). Results do not significantly change.
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The model in this chapter aims to simultaneously capture the procyclicality of interbank
rates and the countercyclicality of corporate bond rates. It also aims to capture the
countercyclicality of the spread between corporate debt and interbank rates. I show that
simulating the model with financial shocks (as an only source of disturbance or combined
with productivity shocks) captures the cyclicality of interbank and corporate rates, their
spread, and the right sign of the correlation between the spread and other macroeconomic
variables. It also generates business cycle statistics in line with US data since 1986. In
contrast, simulating the model with productivity shocks only produces procyclical
corporate debt rate and spread, which contradicts data. It also fails in terms of the
correlation between the spread and other macroeconomic variables. In addition, adding
financial shocks to the model generates volatility in hours worked relative to GDP that is
closer to data.
The link between the financial sector and aggregate economic activity has long been a
subject of interest and ongoing research for macroeconomists. Bernanke (1993) provides
a literature survey (at the time) on the role of credit and credit crises in the economy.
More recent surveys on the effects of financial frictions and shocks on aggregate
economic activity are provided by Quadrini (2011) and Claessens and Kose (2018).
The theoretical literature on the link between financial intermediation and economic
fluctuations can be divided into two broad categories. In the first strand of literature,
financial frictions have been modelled as “amplifiers” of the effects of other shocks, like
productivity shocks for example. Examples of seminal papers in this strand include
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke et al. (1999)
with the financial accelerator mechanism. A more recent example is Boissay et al. (2016)
in which interbank market mechanisms amplify the effects of productivity shocks and can
lead to financial crises.
The second strand of literature has financial shocks as a source of economic fluctuations
rather than having financial frictions being just an amplifier of other shocks (see, e.g.;
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2011; Jermann & Quadrini, 2012; Gertler et al., 2020). This is
not surprising since a period of “Great Moderation” ended with a “Great Recession” that
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was preceded by a financial crisis. This sparked interest in studying the direct effects of
shocks that originate in the financial sector on aggregate economic activity.
Many papers in either strand abstract from having an interbank market (see, e.g.;
Bernanke et al., 1999; Jermann & Quadrini, 2012). Therefore, these papers cannot
capture the interplay between interbank and corporate debt rates and how this relates to
aggregate economic activity. This chapter aims to contribute to filling this gap.
Other papers present models that imply or predict that interbank and corporate rates move
in the same direction relative to GDP (see, e.g.; Gertler & Kiyotaki, 2010; Boissay et al.,
2016). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that can simultaneously
account for the procyclicality of interbank rates, countercyclicality of corporate bond
rates, and countercyclicality of the spreads while generating economic fluctuations in line
with what we observe in the US data since 1986. The choice of the period is due to data
on (US dollar) Libor being available since 1986 only.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents data on the interbank
rates and corporate debt rates and spreads in the US since 1986. The benchmark model is
presented in Section 1.3. Estimation and results are reported in Section 1.4. Sensitivity
analysis and alternative specifications with the related results are presented in Section
1.5. Finally, a conclusion is provided in Section 1.6.

1.2 Interbank Rates and Corporate Bond Rates1
US quarterly data between 1986:Q1 and 2019:Q4 show that real interbank rates are
positively correlated to GDP. This applies to 3m Libor and 12m Libor, based on US
dollar. The correlations between deviations from trend of these rates and deviations from
trend in (log) real GDP are 0.497 and 0.462 respectively. Similar observation applies to
the real effective federal funds rate. The correlation between deviations from trend of that
rate and deviations from trend in (log) real GDP is 0.485. In addition, real interbank rates
are positively correlated to consumption, investment, and hours worked. Table 1-1 below

1

Data retrieved from: https://fred.stlouisfed.org and https://apps.bea.gov. FRED removed US Dollar Libor data on January 31, 2022.
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shows the correlations between interbank rates and macroeconomic variables. Variables
are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing parameter of 1,600
usually used for quarterly data.
Table 1-1: Correlations Between Interbank Rates and Macroeconomic Variables
Effective Federal
Funds Rate

3m Libor

12m Libor

GDP

0.485

0.497

0.462

Consumption

0.439

0.446

0.422

Investment

0.352

0.362

0.316

Hours Worked

0.605

0.639

0.592

In contrast, US data over the same period show that corporate debt rates are
countercyclical. Table 1-2 below shows correlations between deviations from trend of
Moody's Seasoned AAA and BAA Corporate Bond Rates and GDP, consumption,
investment, and hours worked.
Table 1-2: Correlations Between Corporate Rates and Macroeconomic Variables
Moody’s AAA
Moody’s BAA
Corporate Bond Rate Corporate Bond Rate
GDP

-0.202

-0.277

Consumption

-0.153

-0.207

Investment

-0.337

-0.412

Hours Worked

-0.096

-0.120

Finally, the spreads between corporate bond rates and different interbank rates are
strongly countercyclical. Table 1-3 below shows correlations between deviations from
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trend of spreads and GDP, consumption, investment, and hours worked. Table 1-3 uses
Moody's Seasoned AAA Corporate Bond Rate to calculate spreads.
Table 1-3: Correlations Between Spreads (Using AAA) and
Macroeconomic Variables
AAA - Effective
Federal Funds Rate

AAA - 3m Libor

AAA - 12m Libor

GDP

-0.675

-0.714

-0.710

Consumption

-0.588

-0.618

-0.620

Investment

-0.638

-0.676

-0.663

Hours Worked

-0.726

-0.790

-0.770

In addition, Figures 1-1 to 1-3 show the deviations from trend in GDP and in the spread
between Moody’s AAA Corporate Bond Rate and 3m Libor, 12m Libor, and the effective
federal funds rate respectively. Variables are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter,
with a smoothing parameter of 1,600 usually used for quarterly data.
Table 1-4 also shows correlations between deviations from trend of spreads and GDP,
consumption, investment, and hours worked. Table 1-4 uses Moody's Seasoned BAA
Corporate Bond Rate to calculate the spread. In addition, Figures 1-4 to 1-6 show the
deviations from trend in GDP and in the spread between Moody’s BAA Corporate Bond
Rate and 3m Libor, 12m Libor, and the effective federal funds rate respectively. Again,
variables are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing parameter of
1,600 usually used for quarterly data.
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Figure 1-1: (AAA Corporate Bond Rate - 3m Libor) Spread and GDP Deviations From Trend

Figure 1-2: (AAA Corporate Bond Rate - 12m Libor) Spread and GDP Deviations From Trend
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Figure 1-3: (AAA Corporate Bond Rate – Effective Federal Funds Rate) Spread and
GDP - Deviations From Trend

Table 1-4: Correlations Between Spreads (Using BAA) and
Macroeconomic Variables
BAA - Effective
Federal Funds Rate

BAA - 3m Libor

BAA - 12m Libor

GDP

-0.659

-0.711

-0.708

Consumption

-0.551

-0.590

-0.591

Investment

-0.674

-0.728

-0.721

Hours Worked

-0.648

-0.719

-0.695

9

Figure 1-4: (BAA Corporate Bond Rate - 3m Libor) Spread and GDP Deviations From Trend

Figure 1-5: (BAA Corporate Bond Rate - 12m Libor) Spread and GDP Deviations From Trend
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Figure 1-6: (BAA Corporate Bond Rate – Effective Federal Funds Rate) Spread and
GDP - Deviations From Trend
The statistics reported in this section show that interbank rates are usually above trend
whenever GDP is above trend. Given that interbank rates are the benchmark for the rates
on trillions of dollars debt instruments as mentioned, one would predict that debt rates
must show a similar kind of movement.
However, this section shows that deviations from trend in corporate debt rates are
negatively correlated to deviations from trend in GDP. An increase (decrease) in
corporate bond rates implies an increase (decrease) in firms’ cost of borrowing. This may
affect firms’ decisions such as demand for factors of production and the level of
operations and production.
Moreover, the difference between corporate debt rates and interbank bank rates usually
shrinks when GDP is above trend. This is shown by the negative correlation between
deviations from trend in spreads and GDP. Given the relatively high negative correlation
between spreads and GDP (and other macroeconomic variables) shown in this section,
the relationship between these variables warrants further investigation.
In the next section, I present a model that can account for these observations. In this
model, financial shocks that increase the interbank borrowing rate and limit result in a
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decrease in the spread between the firm’s cost of borrowing and the interbank rate, in line
with data. A decrease in the firm’s cost of borrowing increases the firm’s demand for
factors of production and consequently GDP.

1.3 Model
In this section, I present the details of the model. The model is based on Boissay et al.
(2016). The economy is composed of a representative firm, a financial sector, and a
representative household.
Each period, a profit-maximizing representative firm needs a working capital loan. This
is used to pay part of its input costs before production takes place. This loan is obtained
from the financial sector.
The financial sector is composed of intermediaries that differ in their intermediation
efficiency. They collect funds from the household and may supply loans to the firm. They
can borrow from/lend to each other in an interbank market. They can also invest in an
“outside option” and divert funds. Each period, the sector is subject to a shock that affects
its overall intermediation efficiency (financial shock).
The utility-maximizing representative household has an infinite horizon and values
consumption and leisure. Each period, it supplies labour to the firm and funds to the
financial sector. It also accumulates capital.

1.3.1

Firm

Each period, a profit-maximizing representative firm with a standard Cobb-Douglas
production function chooses how much capital to rent and labour to hire and therefore
how much output to produce in order to maximize profit. As mentioned, the firm needs
an intra-period working capital loan to pay part of its input costs before any production
takes place each period. The loan is repaid within the period after production takes place.
The firm faces an aggregate productivity shock that occurs at the beginning of each
period.
The firm’s objective function, in any period 𝑡 ≥ 0, is as follows:
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𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑘𝑡,

ℎ𝑡 }

𝑦𝑡 − (1 + 𝜂𝑘 𝑖𝑡 )𝑅𝑡 𝑘𝑡 − (1 + 𝜂ℎ 𝑖𝑡 )𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡 ,
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼 ℎ𝑡 1−𝛼 ,

𝑦𝑡 is output, 𝐴𝑡 is aggregate productivity, 𝑘𝑡 is capital input, ℎ𝑡 is labour input, and 𝛼 is
the capital share in the production function, with 0 < 𝛼 < 1. Further, 𝑅𝑡 is the rental rate
of capital, 𝑤𝑡 is the wage of labour, 𝜂𝑘 is the share of the capital input cost that the firm
needs to borrow, 𝜂ℎ is the share of the labour input cost that the firm needs to borrow,
with 𝜂𝑘 , 𝜂ℎ ∈ [0,1], and 𝑖𝑡 is the firm’s borrowing cost (that is, the net interest rate
charged by financial intermediaries on the firm’s working capital loan).
The firm’s need for a working capital loan creates a wedge between capital rent and the
marginal product of capital (capital wedge) and a wedge between labour wage and the
marginal product of labour (labour wedge), as shown by the firm’s first order conditions:
(1 + 𝜂𝑘 𝑖𝑡 )𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼−1 ℎ𝑡 1−𝛼
(1 + 𝜂ℎ 𝑖𝑡 )𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼 ℎ𝑡 −𝛼
In the appendix, I show the importance of labour and investment (capital) wedges in
business cycle fluctuations. The wedges in the above equations change with the firm’s
cost of borrowing ( 𝑖𝑡 ), which is affected by shocks. As the equations show, a shock that
changes 𝑖𝑡 will change the wedges and consequently the optimal demand for capital and
labour by the firm. This in turn affects the firm’s level of production and therefore
aggregate output. In addition, it affects equilibrium prices of capital and labour, which
affects the household’s optimal decisions. Therefore, this will affect the overall economic
activity.
Financial shocks originate in the financial sector and change 𝑖𝑡 . Therefore, through
affecting the firm’s cost of borrowing, financial shocks can cause changes in real
macroeconomic variables as shown above. This is the main channel through which
financial shocks affect business cycle fluctuations in the model. Productivity shocks have
a direct effect, since changes in 𝐴𝑡 change the marginal product of capital and the
marginal product of labour, and an indirect effect, since 𝑖𝑡 also changes when 𝐴𝑡 changes.
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1.3.2

Financial Sector

The financial sector is composed of heterogenous intermediaries that differ in their
intermediation efficiency. At the end of each period t-1, period t intermediaries are born
(continuum of measure one). When they are born, they are homogenous, and each
intermediary collects funds (𝑑𝑡 ) from the representative household. At the beginning of
each period t, which is arbitrarily close to the end of period t-1, the financial shock,
which affects the financial sector's overall intermediation efficiency (Z𝑡 ), is realized.
Further, each intermediary draws an individual efficiency level 𝜃 ∈ [0,1]. 𝜃 has an
increasing cumulative distribution function [𝜇(𝜃)], as in Boissay et al. (2016), with
𝜇(0) = 0 and 𝜇(1) = 1.
Intermediaries may borrow in an interbank market to increase individual funds beyond
𝑑𝑡 . They can also lend funds to other intermediaries. An intermediary that lends to other
intermediaries in the interbank market earns gross return per unit equal to 𝜅𝑡 .
Intermediaries can also invest in an “outside option” and earn gross return per unit equal
to 𝛾, which is assumed to be constant for simplicity. The outside option can be thought of
as “storage technology” as per Boissay et al. (2016). It follows that for any intermediary
lending to occur in equilibrium, we must have 𝜅𝑡 ≥ 𝛾. Otherwise, it would be more
profitable for any financial intermediary to invest funds in the “outside option” rather
than lending another intermediary.
In the absence of frictions, it is efficient for all intermediaries to lend to the most efficient
financial intermediary, the one with 𝜃 = 1. However, frictions in the financial sector
block this from happening. Particularly, there is an asymmetric information friction in the
financial sector. This means that financial intermediaries don’t know each others’ types,
and therefore the most efficient intermediary is not known to others.
Another friction in the financial sector is the moral hazard friction. Intermediaries that
borrow 𝜙 units per 𝑑𝑡 in the interbank market can walk away with (1+ 𝜙)𝜉𝛾 per unit and
lending intermediaries can't recover these returns. 𝜉 is a fraction of the gross return on the
outside option (that is, it is between 0 and 1). This gives an incentive for intermediaries to
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borrow in the interbank market and walk away from their interbank debt obligations
when (1+ 𝜙) 𝜉𝛾 > 𝜅𝑡 .
As a result, lending intermediaries put a limit on borrowing intermediaries. The fact that
types are unknown due to asymmetric information make all intermediaries face the same
borrowing limit in the interbank market. The limit ensures that all intermediaries that
borrow in the interbank market are doing so to expand their funds available to lend to the
firm. That is, the limit in any period t is such that (1+ 𝜙)𝜉𝛾 ≤ 𝜅𝑡 . It can be shown that
the constraint binds for any borrowing intermediary (Boissay et al., 2016). So, in any t:
𝜙𝑡 =

𝜅𝑡 − 𝜉𝛾
.
𝜉𝛾

Intermediaries can also lend their funds to the representative firm. An intermediary with
efficiency level (𝜃) earns Z𝑡 𝜃(1+ 𝑖𝑡 ) gross return per unit lent to the firm. This is because
the intermediary pays an "intermediation cost" equal to Z𝑡 (1- 𝜃)(1+ 𝑖𝑡 ) per unit of loan.
To avoid having a deadweight loss, it is assumed that the intermediation cost is rebated as
a lumpsum payment or transfer (𝜏𝑡 ) to the household as in Boissay et al. (2016).
The higher the 𝜃 the lower the intermediation cost to be paid. In the case of 𝜃 = 1, the
intermediation cost is equal to zero. It follows that for any firm lending to occur in
equilibrium, we must have Z𝑡 (1+𝑖𝑡 ) ≥ 𝜅𝑡 . Otherwise, it would be more profitable for any
financial intermediary to lend to other intermediaries rather than lending to the firm. It
also follows that Z𝑡 (1+𝑖𝑡 ) ≥ 𝛾 since 𝜅𝑡 ≥ 𝛾.
Also, the higher the Z𝑡 , the lower the intermediation cost and therefore, ceteris paribus,
the higher the gross return per unit of loan provided to the representative firm by any
intermediary. This is expected to increase the demand for interbank borrowing and
decrease the supply of interbank lending as more intermediaries would find it more
profitable to lend to the firm. This results in an upward pressure on 𝜅𝑡 and a downward
pressure on 𝑖𝑡 . In equilibrium, and since financial shocks are persistent, 𝜅𝑡 will be above
trend while 𝑖𝑡 will be below trend for a number of periods following a positive financial
shock. Therefore, the spread between the two will be below trend during these periods as
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well. With a lower 𝑖𝑡 , the representative firm increases its demand for inputs. This leads
to higher output. Therefore, output will be above trend for this number of periods. As a
result, with financial shocks, the model predicts that the interbank rate will be
procyclical, the corporate debt rate will be countercyclical, and the spread will be
countercyclical, in line with US data.
By borrowing 𝜙𝑡 units per unit of 𝑑𝑡 , an intermediary with efficiency level (𝜃) can earn
an extra Z𝑡 𝜃(1+𝑖𝑡 )𝜙𝑡 while having to pay 𝜅𝑡 𝜙𝑡 . Hence, an intermediary, 𝜃, will choose to
borrow from other intermediaries as long as:
Z𝑡 𝜃(1+𝑖𝑡 )(1+𝜙𝑡 ) - 𝜅𝑡 𝜙𝑡 ≥ 𝜅𝑡 .
Otherwise, it will be a lender in the interbank market. The threshold, 𝜃𝑡̅ , that makes an
intermediary indifferent between borrowing from or lending to other intermediaries is
hence given by:
Z𝑡 𝜃𝑡̅ (1+𝑖𝑡 )(1+ 𝜙𝑡 ) - 𝜅𝑡 𝜙𝑡 = 𝜅𝑡
⟹ Z𝑡 𝜃𝑡̅ (1+𝑖𝑡 )(1+ 𝜙𝑡 ) = (1 + 𝜙𝑡 )𝜅𝑡
⟹ Z𝑡 𝜃𝑡̅ (1+𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝜅𝑡
⟹ 𝜃𝑡̅ =

𝜅𝑡
Z𝑡 (1 + 𝑖𝑡 )

Interbank market clearing implies that 𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ )𝑑𝑡 = [1 − 𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ )]𝜙𝑡 𝑑𝑡 . The left-hand side is
the supply of interbank loans, and the right-hand side is the demand for interbank loans.
𝑑𝑡 cancels out from both sides, so we get:
𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ ) = [1 − 𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ )]𝜙𝑡
An increase in the interbank rate (𝜅𝑡 ) increases the interbank borrowing limit (𝜙𝑡 ).
Intuitively, a higher 𝜅𝑡 makes it less likely for borrowing in the interbank market and
investing in the outside option to be more profitable than simply lending in the interbank
market.
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At the end of t, each intermediary collects its returns, pays back 𝑑𝑡 plus a return on 𝑑𝑡 to
the household, and exits this world. Intermediaries' profit maximization implies that the
average gross return (1 + 𝑟𝑡 ) on 𝑑𝑡 for the representative household is given by:
̅𝑡
𝜃

1

1 + 𝑟𝑡 = ∫ 𝜅𝑡 𝑑𝜇(𝜃) + ∫ [𝑍𝑡 𝜃(1 + 𝑖𝑡 )(1 + 𝜙𝑡 ) − 𝜅𝑡 𝜙𝑡 ] 𝑑𝜇(𝜃)
̅𝑡
𝜃

0

1.3.3

Household

The representative household faces an infinite horizon. It values consumption and leisure.
It supplies funds to the financial sector. It supplies labour to the representative firm. Also,
it accumulates capital. The representative household’s utility maximization problem is as
follows:
∞

𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑐𝑡,

ℎ𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡+1 , 𝑑𝑡+1 }

𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽 𝑡 𝑈(𝑐𝑡 , ℎ𝑡 ) ,
𝑡=0

𝑠. 𝑡.

𝑐𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡 𝑘𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡 )𝑑𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 ,
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 ,
𝑐𝑡 ≥ 0 , 0 ≤ ℎ𝑡 ≤ 1 , ∀𝑡 ≥ 0 ,
𝑑0 , 𝑘0 given.

This yields the following standard first order conditions for the household’s optimal
decisions on consumption (𝑐𝑡 ), labour supply (ℎ𝑡 ), future period capital (𝑘𝑡+1 ) and 𝑑𝑡+1 :
𝑈ℎ𝑡 / 𝑈𝑐𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 ,
𝑈𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸t [ 𝑈𝑐𝑡+1 (1 + 𝑅𝑡+1 − 𝛿)],
𝑈𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸t [ 𝑈𝑐𝑡+1 (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1 )].
In the macroeconomic literature, it is established that productivity shocks affect the
representative household’s optimal decisions. This is because when 𝐴𝑡 changes, so will
𝑤𝑡 and the expectation of 𝑅𝑡+1 (and 𝑟𝑡+1 in this model). In this model, financial shocks,
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through changing 𝑖𝑡 and 𝜅𝑡 , also affect 𝑤𝑡 , 𝑅𝑡 , and 𝑟𝑡 . In addition, they affect the
expectations of 𝑅𝑡+1 , and 𝑟𝑡+1. Therefore, shocks in the financial sector affect the
representative households’ intratemporal and intertemporal decisions each period.

1.3.4

Equilibrium Equations:

In any t, there are 11 unknowns {𝑘𝑡+1 , 𝑑𝑡+1 , 𝑐𝑡 , ℎ𝑡 , 𝑤𝑡 , 𝑅𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡 , 𝑖𝑡 , 𝜅𝑡 , 𝜙𝑡 , 𝜃𝑡̅ } and 11
equilibrium equations as follows (𝐴𝑡 , 𝑍𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡 , 𝑑𝑡 are known by the beginning of t):
(1) (1 + 𝜂𝑘 𝑖𝑡 )𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼−1 ℎ𝑡 1−𝛼
(2) (1 + 𝜂ℎ 𝑖𝑡 )𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼 ℎ𝑡 −𝛼
(3) 𝑈ℎ𝑡 / 𝑈𝑐𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡
(4) 𝑈𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸t [ 𝑈𝑐𝑡+1 (1 + 𝑅𝑡+1 − 𝛿)]
(5) 𝑈𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸t [ 𝑈𝑐𝑡+1 (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1 )]

(6) 𝜙𝑡 =

𝜅𝑡 −𝜉𝛾

(7) 𝜃𝑡̅ = Z

𝜉𝛾

𝜅𝑡
(1+𝑖
𝑡
𝑡)

(8) 𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ ) = [1 − 𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ )]𝜙𝑡
̅
𝜃

1

(9) 1 + 𝑟𝑡 = ∫0 𝑡 𝜅𝑡 𝑑𝜇(𝜃) + ∫𝜃̅ [𝑍𝑡 𝜃(1 + 𝑖𝑡 )(1 + 𝜙𝑡 ) − 𝜅𝑡 𝜙𝑡 ] 𝑑𝜇(𝜃)
𝑡
(10) 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡 𝑘𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡 )𝑑𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡
(11) 𝜂𝑘 𝑅𝑡 𝑘𝑡 + 𝜂ℎ 𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡 = 𝑑𝑡
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1.4 Model Simulation and Results
1.4.1

Parameterization

For benchmark model simulations, I use the following utility function:
𝑐𝑡 1−𝝈 ℎ𝑡 1+𝜗
−
.
1−𝜎 1+𝜗
I set 𝜎 = 1 so the function becomes 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑐𝑡 ) −

ℎ𝑡 1+𝜗
1+𝜗

. The Frisch elasticity of labour

supply is given by 1/ 𝜗 with this utility functional form. To that end, I set 𝜗 to 1/2 which
implies a Frisch elasticity of 2 which is in line with macroeconomic estimates. In section
1.5, I show results with 𝜎 = 2 and 𝜗 = 1. Also, in Appendix A, I show the results of
model simulation with a GHH utility function.
To estimate the financial shocks, I assume that in any period, 𝑍𝑡 is equal to a steady state
Z multiplied by 𝑒 𝑢𝑡 ,

where 𝑢𝑡 follows an AR(1) process with an i.i.d. error term

𝜀𝑡𝑢 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢2 ):
𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢 𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑢
I jointly calibrate the steady state value of Z with 𝜉𝛾 to target the long-run averages of the
real interbank rate (3m Libor) and real corporate bond rate (average of AAA and BAA).
To obtain estimates for 𝜌𝑢 and 𝜎𝑢 , I construct a time series for 𝑍𝑡 using equilibrium
equations from the model along with data on 3m Libor and corporate bond rates as
follows.
From equilibrium equation (8):
𝜙
𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ ) = [1 − 𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ )]𝜙𝑡 ⟹ 𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ ) = (1+𝜙𝑡 )
𝑡

(12)

From equilibrium equation (6):
𝜙𝑡 =

𝜅𝑡 −𝜉𝛾
𝜉𝛾

𝜙

⟹ 1+𝜙𝑡 =
𝑡

𝜅𝑡 −𝜉𝛾
𝜅𝑡

(13)
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I follow Boissay et al. (2016) and assume that 𝜇(𝜃) = 𝜃 𝜆 with 𝜆 = 26. When combining
this with (12) and (13), I get that:
𝜅 − 𝜉𝛾
𝜃𝑡̅ = ( 𝑡 𝜅 )

1⁄
𝜆

𝑡

(14)

Combining (14) with equilibrium equation (7), I get:
𝑍𝑡 =

𝜅𝑡
1
𝜅𝑡 − 𝜉𝛾 ⁄𝜆
(1+𝑖𝑡 )(
)
𝜅𝑡

(15)

Using data on 𝜅𝑡 , the gross real interbank rate, for which I use 3m Libor minus inflation,
and on 𝑖𝑡 , the real corporate bond rate, for which I use the average of (AAA-inflation)
and (BAA-inflation), with the calibrated values of 𝜉𝛾 and 𝜆, I construct a time series for
𝑍𝑡 using equation (15). I use the constructed series to estimate 𝜌𝑢 and 𝜎𝑢 . Estimated 𝜌𝑢
and 𝜎𝑢 are 0.9611 and 0.0042 respectively.
For productivity shocks, I follow the standard method of constructing a time series for 𝐴𝑡
using 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼 ℎ𝑡 1−𝛼 and data on output, capital, and labour assuming that 𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴𝑒 𝑧𝑡 ,
where 𝐴 = 1 and 𝑧𝑡 follows an AR(1) process as follows:
𝑧𝑡 = 𝜌𝑧 𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑧 ,
where 𝜀𝑡𝑧 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑧2 ). Estimated 𝜌𝑧 and 𝜎𝑧 are 0.9802 and 0.0047 respectively.
Parameter values used in the benchmark simulation are shown in Table 1-5 below.

1.4.2

Results

Tables 1-6, 1-7 and 1-8 below show the results of the benchmark model simulation with
financial shocks only, with productivity shocks only, and with both types of shocks using
the utility function from the previous section and parameter values from Table 1-5.
Results in Table 1-6 show that simulating the model with financial or productivity or both
types of shocks capture the relative volatilities of consumption and investment and their
correlations with GDP fairly well.
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Table 1-5: Parameter Values for Benchmark Model Simulation
Parameter

Value

Target or Source

𝜎

1

Standard

𝜗

0.5

Standard

𝛽

0.98

Standard

𝛿

0.025

Standard

𝛼

0.39

Average capital share in the US since 1986

𝜂𝑘

0.5

Fraction of capital rent borrowed = 50% (Phaneuf & Victor, 2017)

𝜂ℎ

0.43

Fraction of labour wage borrowed = 43% (Phaneuf & Victor, 2017)

Z

0.981

𝜉

0.255

𝛾

0.952

Boissay et al. (2016)

𝜇(𝜃)

𝜃𝜆

Boissay et al. (2016)

𝜆

26

Boissay et al. (2016)

𝜌𝑢

0.9611

Estimated using 𝑍𝑡 constructed time series

𝜎𝑢

0.0042

Estimated using 𝑍𝑡 constructed time series

𝜌𝑧

0.9802

Estimated using 𝐴𝑡 constructed time series

𝜎𝑧

0.0047

Estimated using 𝐴𝑡 constructed time series

jointly calibrated to target long-run average interbank rate and
average corporate rate
jointly calibrated to target long-run average interbank rate and
average corporate rate
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Table 1-6: Model Simulation Results - Benchmark
Data
1986:Q1
to
2019:Q4

Model with

Model with

Financial

Productivity

Shocks

Shocks

Model with
Both Shocks

Standard deviation relative to GDP
Consumption

0.838

0.676

0.668

0.682

Investment

4.958

3.114

2.728

2.809

Hours worked

1.245

0.941

0.333

0.545

Consumption

0.891

0.813

0.902

0.878

Investment

0.867

0.876

0.894

0.883

Hours worked

0.873

0.920

0.745

0.697

Correlation to GDP

Variables are detrended. Std. deviations & correlations are computed using deviations from trend.

However, simulating the model with productivity shocks only yields a relatively low
standard deviation of hours worked relative to GDP when compared to data. Adding
financial shocks to the model improves the estimated relative standard deviation of hours
worked and brings it closer to data. In particular, when the model is simulated with only
financial shocks, the relative standard deviation of hours is much closer to data than when
productivity shocks are included. This is because the direct effect of financial shocks on
output is through input demand. In contrast, productivity shocks have a direct effect on
output (as a higher 𝐴𝑡 results in higher 𝑦𝑡 , ceteris paribus). In addition, changes in 𝐴𝑡
change input demand. As a result, the volatility of hours is higher with financial shocks.
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In addition, when financial shocks are included, simulating the model (whether with only
financial shocks or with both shocks together) yields procyclical interbank rate,
countercyclical corporate rate, and countercyclical spread as shown in Table 1-7. It also
yields the right sign for the correlations between the spread and consumption, investment,
and hours worked, as shown in Table 1-8.
In contrast, simulating the model with productivity shocks only fails to capture the
cyclicality of rates and the correlations of the spread with GDP and other macroeconomic
variables as shown in Table 1-7 and Table 1-8.
Table 1-7: Rates & Spread Correlations with GDP - Benchmark
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

Interbank

0.497

0.158

0.136

0.130

Corporate

-0.240

-0.979

0.136

-0.393

Spread

-0.713

-0.959

0.136

-0.463

Model with
Both Shocks

Table 1-8: Spread (Corporate – Interbank) Correlations with GDP &
Other Macroeconomic Variables - Benchmark
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

GDP

-0.713

-0.959

0.136

-0.463

Consumption

-0.604

-0.639

0.045

-0.195

Investment

-0.702

-0.905

-0.082

-0.565

Hours Worked

-0.755

-0.967

-0.235

-0.847

Model with
Both Shocks
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1.5 Sensitivity Analysis and Alternative Specifications
In this section, I show the results of simulating the model using different parameter
values and alternative specifications. While the values of estimated statistics change as
expected, the main conclusion stands. That is, when financial shocks are included,
whether standalone or with productivity shocks, simulating the model, while capturing
the right signs of the correlations of the interbank and corporate rates and their spread
with GDP and other macroeconomic variables, also brings the relative volatility of hours
worked closer to data while generating other statistics broadly in line with data.
In contrast, simulating the model with productivity shocks as a sole source of
disturbance, not only underestimates hours’ relative volatility, but it also generates the
wrong sign of the correlation between GDP and the corporate debt rate and between GDP
and the corporate-interbank spread.
When financial shocks are included in the simulation, the generated correlations between
consumption, investment and hours worked on one hand, and the interbank rate, the
corporate debt rate and their spread on another hand are closer to data relative to when
the model is simulated with only productivity shocks.

1.5.1

Sensitivity to Parameter Values

I start with simulating the model with 𝜎 = 2. Results are shown in Tables 1-9 to 1-11
below. With 𝜎 = 2, the household prefers a smoother consumption path than with 𝜎 = 1.
As a result, with a higher 𝜎, there is a decrease in consumption volatility and an increase
in the volatilities of investment and hours worked. While this moves the relative volatility
of consumption further from what it is in data, it brings the relative volatilities of
investment and hours worked closer to data.
Interestingly, when 𝜎 is set to 2 rather than 1, simulating the model with productivity
shocks not only underestimates the relative volatility of hours worked, but it also
generates hours that are countercyclical which contradicts the procyclicality of hours
worked observed in data. The statistics generated when simulating the model with
financial shocks remain broadly in line with data.
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When it comes to the interbank and corporate debt rates’ correlations with GDP and other
macroeconomic variables, no significant changes are observed when simulating the
model with 𝜎 = 2. That is, with productivity shocks only, the interbank rate, the corporate
debt rate, and their spread are all procyclical. This contradicts data. When financial
shocks are included, model simulation still captures the right cyclicality of the interbank
and corporate debt rates and their spread. In addition, no significant changes are noted in
the estimated correlations between the spread and consumption, investment and hours
worked generated by simulating the model with different shocks.
Table 1-9: Model Simulation Results – 𝝈 = 2
Data
1986:Q1
to
2019:Q4

Model with

Model with

Financial

Productivity

Shocks

Shocks

Model with
Both Shocks

Standard deviation relative to GDP
Consumption

0.838

0.540

0.617

0.614

Investment

4.958

3.484

2.749

2.937

Hours worked

1.245

0.988

0.343

0.600

Consumption

0.891

0.809

0.941

0.903

Investment

0.867

0.912

0.914

0.904

Hours worked

0.873

0.860

-0.391

0.142

Correlation to GDP
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Table 1-10: Rates & Spread Correlations with GDP – 𝝈 = 2
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

Interbank

0.497

0.165

0.160

0.142

Corporate

-0.240

-0.992

0.160

-0.440

Spread

-0.713

-0.972

0.160

-0.491

Model with
Both Shocks

Table 1-11: Spread (Corporate – Interbank) Correlations with GDP &
Other Macroeconomic Variables – 𝝈 = 2
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

GDP

-0.713

-0.972

0.160

-0.491

Consumption

-0.604

-0.698

0.135

-0.225

Investment

-0.702

-0.881

-0.126

-0.576

Hours Worked

-0.755

-0.904

-0.477

-0.786

Model with
Both Shocks

Therefore, the general picture when simulating the model with 𝜎 = 2 does not change.
Simulating the model with only productivity shocks generates many statistics that
contradict data. If anything, when 𝜎 = 2 some statistics are further away from what they
are in data (like the correlation between the deviations from trend in hours worked and
the deviations from trend in (log) GDP, for example). In contrast, when financial shocks
are included, all statistics remain broadly in line with data. In particular, hours’ relative
volatility is closer to data, and the correlations between the interbank rate, the corporate
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debt rate and their spread and GDP and other macroeconomic variables are broadly in
line with data.
Next, I simulate the model with 𝜗 = 1 rather than 𝜗 = 1/2. With 𝜗 = 1, the Frisch
elasticity of labour supply is lower (1 as opposed to 2). This leads to lower volatility in
hours worked. With a lower Frisch elasticity, the household’s optimal labour supply
decision is less responsive to changes in wages caused by financial shocks and
productivity shocks. As a result, it is not surprising that hours’ relative volatility
generated by model simulation decreases. Other statistics are close to estimates from
previous simulations as shown in Tables 1-12, 1-13, and 1-14 below.
Table 1-12: Model Simulation Results – 𝝑 = 1
Data
1986:Q1
to
2019:Q4

Model with

Model with

Financial

Productivity

Shocks

Shocks

Model with
Both Shocks

Standard deviation relative to GDP
Consumption

0.838

0.679

0.675

0.693

Investment

4.958

3.323

2.653

2.771

Hours worked

1.245

0.863

0.244

0.425

Consumption

0.891

0.751

0.906

0.873

Investment

0.867

0.866

0.898

0.879

Hours worked

0.873

0.909

0.727

0.637

Correlation to GDP
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Table 1-13: Rates & Spread Correlations with GDP – 𝝑 = 1
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

Interbank

0.497

0.155

0.155

0.138

Corporate

-0.240

-0.965

0.155

-0.306

Spread

-0.713

-0.945

0.155

-0.387

Model with
Both Shocks

Table 1-14: Spread (Corporate – Interbank) Correlations with GDP &
Other Macroeconomic Variables – 𝝑 = 1
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

GDP

-0.713

-0.945

0.155

-0.387

Consumption

-0.604

-0.509

0.044

-0.083

Investment

-0.702

-0.921

-0.045

-0.544

Hours Worked

-0.755

-0.975

-0.255

-0.857

Model with
Both Shocks

As shown in Tables 1-12 to 1-14, the main conclusion remains unchanged. Simulating
the model with financial shocks, whether on their own or combined with productivity
shocks, generates statistics (correlations and relative standard deviations) that are closer
to data than those generated when simulating the model with productivity shocks only.
When financial shocks are included, hours’ relative volatility is closer to data, the
correlations between the interbank rate, the corporate debt rate and their spread and GDP
and other macroeconomic variables are in line with data. All other statistics are also in
line with data.
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1.5.2
1.5.2.1

Alternative Specifications
Financial Shocks as a Function of Productivity Shocks

In the benchmark simulation, it is assumed that financial shocks are uncorrelated to
productivity shocks. In this section, I assume that financial shocks are perfectly correlated
to productivity shocks. In particular, as an alternative specification, I assume that the
financial sector’s overall efficiency (𝑍𝑡 ) is a linear function of aggregate productivity
(𝐴𝑡 ):
𝑍𝑡 = 𝜁𝐴𝑡 .
I jointly calibrate 𝜁 and 𝜉𝛾 to target the long-run averages of the real interbank rate (3m
Libor) and real corporate bond rate (average of AAA and BAA). All other parameter
values are the same as the ones used for the benchmark simulation (values reported in
Table 1-5). I simulate the model with productivity shocks, assuming that 𝑍𝑡 changes with
𝐴𝑡 as shown above. Results are reported in Tables 1-15 to 1-17 below.
As the results reported in Tables 1-15 to 1-17 below show, when simulating the model
with 𝑍𝑡 being perfectly correlated to 𝐴𝑡 , the statistics generated are once again broadly in
line with data. In terms of consumption, investment, and hours worked, the correlations
with GDP and the relative standard deviations generated are close to those generated in
the benchmark simulation (Table 1-6). In terms of rates and the spread, the alternative
simulation also generates the right signs of their correlations with GDP and other
macroeconomic variables.
Therefore, the alternative specification maintains the main results from the benchmark
simulation and supports the same conclusion. That is, having variations in the financial
sector’s efficiency improves the model’s ability to capture the right signs of the
correlations between the interbank and corporate rates and their spread with GDP and
other macroeconomic variables, and to bring the relative volatility of hours closer to data
while generating other statistics in line with data. This conclusion holds whether financial
shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated to productivity shocks, as in the benchmark
simulation, or perfectly correlated to productivity shocks, as in this specification.
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Table 1-15: Model Simulation Results - 𝒁𝒕 as a Function of 𝑨𝒕
Data
1986:Q1
to

Model –
Benchmark

Model –

with Both

with

Types of

𝑍𝑡 = 𝜁𝐴𝑡

2019:Q4

Shocks

Standard deviation relative to GDP
Consumption

0.838

0.682

0.618

Investment

4.958

2.809

3.230

Hours worked

1.245

0.545

0.559

Consumption

0.891

0.878

0.808

Investment

0.867

0.883

0.885

Hours worked

0.873

0.697

0.861

Correlation to GDP

Table 1-16: Rates & Spread Correlations with GDP 𝒁𝒕 as a Function of 𝑨𝒕
Data

Model –

Model –

1986:Q1 to

Benchmark with Both

with

2019:Q4

Types of Shocks

𝑍𝑡 = 𝜁𝐴𝑡

Interbank

0.497

0.130

0.095

Corporate

-0.240

-0.393

-0.681

Spread

-0.713

-0.463

-0.964
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Table 1-17: Spread (Corporate – Interbank) Correlations with GDP & Other
Macroeconomic Variables - 𝒁𝒕 as a Function of 𝑨𝒕
Model –
Data

Benchmark

Model –

1986:Q1 to

with Both

with

2019:Q4

Types of

𝑍𝑡 = 𝜁𝐴𝑡

Shocks
GDP

-0.713

-0.463

-0.964

Consumption

-0.604

-0.195

-0.654

Investment

-0.702

-0.565

-0.884

Hours Worked

-0.755

-0.847

-0.878

1.5.2.2

Borrowing Only Capital Input Costs

It is noteworthy that many papers from the literature on the macrofinance link ignore the
need of firms to borrow labour input costs, and focus only on the need to borrow funds to
finance capital investments (e.g.; Boissay et al., 2016). To that end, in this section, I drop
the need to borrow labour input costs, and assume that the representative firm needs only
to borrow part of its capital input costs before production takes place.
In this case, the firm’s objective function is rewritten as follows:
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑘𝑡,

ℎ𝑡 }

𝑦𝑡 − (1 + 𝜂𝑘 𝑖𝑡 )𝑅𝑡 𝑘𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡 ,

𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼 ℎ𝑡 1−𝛼 .
First order conditions now show only a capital wedge, but no labour wedge.
(1 + 𝜂𝑘 𝑖𝑡 )𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼−1 ℎ𝑡 1−𝛼
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼 ℎ𝑡 −𝛼
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All other equilibrium equations remain the same as in the benchmark model. Again,
I simulate the model with productivity shocks only, financial shocks only, and both types
of shocks, using parameter values from Table 1-5. Results are reported in Tables 1-18 to
1-20 below.
Table 1-18: Model Simulation Results - Borrowing Only Capital Input Costs
Data
1986:Q1
to
2019:Q4

Model with

Model with

Financial

Productivity

Shocks

Shocks

Model with
Both Shocks

Standard deviation relative to GDP
Consumption

0.838

0.703

0.666

0.689

Investment

4.958

4.299

2.631

2.744

Hours worked

1.245

0.641

0.331

0.358

Consumption

0.891

0.405

0.904

0.866

Investment

0.867

0.851

0.926

0.897

Hours worked

0.873

0.743

0.813

0.760

Correlation to GDP

The results show that while model simulation with financial shocks is still able to
generate the right signs of the correlations between the interbank and corporate rates and
their spread with GDP and other macroeconomic variables, it performs worse than the
benchmark simulation in terms of the relative volatility of hours worked. This is expected
since in this specification, the firm’s labour demand decision is no longer directly related
to its cost of borrowing. As a result, while variations in 𝑖𝑡 still affect optimal labour
demand and therefore equilibrium hours through the effect on the firm’s capital demand,
the variations in equilibrium hours are now less correlated to variations in 𝑖𝑡 . That being
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said, with this specification, simulating the model with only financial shocks generates
relative volatilities of consumption and investment that are closer to data that those
generated by the benchmark simulation. However, the correlation between consumption
and GDP is weaker under this specification.
Table 1-19: Rates & Spread Correlations with GDP Borrowing Only Capital Input Costs
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

Interbank

0.497

0.244

0.246

0.219

Corporate

-0.240

-0.946

0.246

-0.085

Spread

-0.713

-0.959

0.246

-0.254

Model with
Both Shocks

Table 1-20: Spread (Corporate – Interbank) Correlations with GDP & Other
Macroeconomic Variables - Borrowing Only Capital Input Costs
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

GDP

-0.713

-0.959

0.246

-0.254

Consumption

-0.604

-0.128

0.055

0.054

Investment

-0.702

-0.963

0.271

-0.475

Hours Worked

-0.755

-0.903

0.426

-0.547

Model with
Both Shocks
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1.5.2.3

Borrowing Only Labour Input Costs

In this section, I go to the other end. I drop the need to borrow capital input costs and
assume that the representative firm needs only to borrow part of its labour input costs
before production takes place. This is expected to increase the relative volatility of hours
worked.
In this case, the firm’s objective function is rewritten as follows:
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑘𝑡,

ℎ𝑡 }

𝑦𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡 𝑘𝑡 − (1 + 𝜂ℎ 𝑖𝑡 )𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡 ,

𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼 ℎ𝑡 1−𝛼 .
First order conditions now show only a labour wedge, but no capital wedge.
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼−1 ℎ𝑡 1−𝛼
(1 + 𝜂ℎ 𝑖𝑡 )𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼 ℎ𝑡 −𝛼
All other equilibrium equations remain the same as in the benchmark model. I simulate
the model with productivity shocks only, financial shocks only, and both types of shocks,
using parameter values from Table 1-5. Results are reported in Tables 1-21 to 1-23.
The results show that with this alternative specification, model simulation with financial
shocks generates volatility in hours that is higher than GDP (in terms of deviations from
trend), which is in line with data. That is, with this specification, the model simulation
with only financial shocks generates a ratio between standard deviation of hours worked
and GDP that is higher than 1. This is in line with what we observe in data, that is, the
standard deviation of hours worked is higher than the standard deviation that GDP.
Simulating the model with financial shocks is able to generate this statistic when the firm
needs to borrow to pay for only its labour input and not for the capital input. This is
because, in this specification, the direct channel through which financial shocks affect
GDP is through labour. That being said, the generated relative volatility of investment
under this specification is further from data compared to benchmark simulation.
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Table 1-21: Model Simulation Results - Borrowing Only Labour Input Costs
Data
1986:Q1

Model with

Model with

Financial

Productivity

Shocks

Shocks

to
2019:Q4

Model with
Both Shocks

Standard deviation relative to GDP
Consumption

0.838

0.789

0.666

0.669

Investment

4.958

2.315

2.669

2.643

Hours worked

1.245

1.194

0.339

0.508

Consumption

0.891

0.949

0.900

0.911

Investment

0.867

0.856

0.913

0.915

Hours worked

0.873

0.969

0.741

0.676

Correlation to GDP

Table 1-22: Rates & Spread Correlations with GDP Borrowing Only Labour Input Costs
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

Interbank

0.497

0.068

0.127

0.102

Corporate

-0.240

-0.990

0.127

-0.256

Spread

-0.713

-0.961

0.127

-0.316

Model with
Both Shocks
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Table 1-23: Spread (Corporate – Interbank) Correlations with GDP & Other
Macroeconomic Variables - Borrowing Only Labour Input Costs
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

GDP

-0.713

-0.961

0.127

-0.316

Consumption

-0.604

-0.885

0.043

-0.205

Investment

-0.702

-0.792

0.022

-0.343

Hours Worked

-0.755

-0.964

-0.259

-0.766

Model with
Both Shocks

In addition, other statistics remain broadly in line with data when financial shocks are
included. Hence, once again the main conclusion holds. Model simulation with only
productivity shocks fails in capturing the right signs of correlations between rates and
spread with GDP and other macroeconomic variables and underestimates hours relative
volatility. Adding financial shocks to the model, whether as the only source of
disturbance or together with productivity shocks, improves the model’s ability in
generating statistics that are closer to data.
Appendix A shows results of simulating the model with another alternative specification.
In that specification, 𝑍𝑡 is assumed to equal Z for all t, and financial shocks are modelled
as variations in 𝜉. As shown in Appendix A, the main conclusion holds; however,
modelling financial shocks as variations in 𝑍𝑡 generates statistics that are overall closer to
data.
In addition, Appendix A also shows the results of the benchmark simulation when using
data on 12m Libor in one case and on the effective federal funds rate in another case as
measures of the interbank rate when estimating financial shocks. In either case,
simulating the model with financial shocks still leads to the same conclusion.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I build on the model of Boissay et al. (2016) to include financial shocks,
exogenous variations in the efficiency of the financial sector, and a firm’s working capital
loan requirement. I use the model’s equilibrium equations along with data on interbank
and corporate debt rates to estimate financial shocks.
Simulating the model with financial shocks (whether alone or with productivity shocks)
generates procyclical interbank rate, countercyclical corporate debt rate, and
countercyclical spread between the two in line with data. It also generates the right sign
for the correlations between the spread and other macroeconomic variables. In addition,
the model generates business cycle fluctuations in line with the US data since the mid1980s. In particular, the model simulation with financial shocks generates volatility in
hours worked relative to GDP that is closer to data. In contrast, simulating the model with
only productivity shocks fails in capturing the cyclicality of rates and the correlations of
the spread with macroeconomic variables. It also underestimates the relative volatility of
hours worked.
This highlights the importance of fluctuations in the financial sector as a source of wider
economic fluctuations. This is in line with the empirical findings of Caldara et al. (2016)
that since the mid-1980s in the US, financial shocks have been a significant source of
business cycle fluctuations. This implies that reducing fluctuations in the financial sector
can help reduce economic fluctuations.
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Chapter 2

2

Tighter Debt Limits, Default, and Labour Supply

2.1 Introduction
During the financial crisis that started in 2007 and the Great Recession that followed,
banks in the United States (US) and around the world tightened lending standards
(Quadrini, 2011; Puri, et al.2011). For example, in the US, the median credit card limit
decreased by 20% (Santucci, 2015).
Meanwhile, non-business bankruptcy filings almost doubled, and hours worked dropped
during that period. The number of non-business bankruptcy filings increased from
775,344 in 2007 to more than 1.3 million in 2009 before peaking at more than 1.5 million
in 2010 (Courts, 2018). Also, hours worked in the non-farm business sector in the US
decreased by 10% between Q4:2007 and Q4:2009.
In this chapter, I first ask how does tightening debt limits affect labour supply decisions?
Conventional wisdom says that a tighter debt limit is like a negative wealth shock which
pushes indebted households to increase labour supply (Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2017).
However, in the Great Recession we witnessed tightening debt limits and a decrease in
aggregate hours worked.
Given the rise in non-business bankruptcy filings that accompanied the decrease in hours
worked, I therefore ask the following. How does default (bankruptcy filing) affect labour
supply decisions? To the best of my knowledge, this question has been overlooked by the
literature on consumer bankruptcy, with few exceptions. An example is Han and Li
(2007), who find a negative yet insignificant effect in an empirical study. In contrast,
Chen and Zhao (2017) report a positive effect. In this chapter, I aim to contribute to
answering this question theoretically.
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As mentioned, there was a notable increase in non-business bankruptcy during the
financial crisis, between 2007 and 2010. In addition, there has been a growing interest in
studying consumer bankruptcy given the increase in consumer bankruptcy that occurred
in the US over the past few decades (Livshits et al., 2010). Livshits et al. (2010) mention
that one of the main contributors to that increase is the drop in the cost of bankruptcy and
the drop in the cost of lending. In addition, Li et al. (2011) highlight the role of consumer
bankruptcy in avoiding foreclosures. Bankruptcy is even mentioned as a source of health
insurance (Mahoney, 2015). Fieldhouse et al. (2018) study cyclical fluctuations in
consumer bankruptcy. However, this literature has mostly abstracted from the effect of
bankruptcy filing on households’ labour supply decisions (Chen & Zhao, 2017).
To study the effect of tightening debt limits on households’ labour supply decisions when
default (bankruptcy) is allowed, I build on the models from Guerrieri and Lorenzoni
(2017) and Fieldhouse et al. (2018). In the model in this chapter, households live
infinitely. They enter with different debt levels and draw different levels of productivity.
Productivity is persistent. Markets are incomplete. That is, households can borrow by
issuing one-period non-contingent bonds. They borrow from a risk-neutral competitive
financial intermediary. Households can default on their debt.
The financial intermediary has an outside option paying a net return of 𝑟. It faces a
transaction cost of lending to households equal to a fraction 𝜏 ∈[0,1]. A negative financial
shock is modeled as an unexpected increase in 𝜏, which tightens debt limits.
I solve for the model's stationary equilibrium with and without default, before and after a
negative financial shock. When debt gets discharged for a household that defaults, this
acts like a positive wealth shock. As a result, I find that households who find it optimal to
default after the shock decrease their labour supply. They increase it if default is not
allowed. This is because a tighter debt limit is like a negative wealth shock as mentioned.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the model is presented in Section 2.2,
main results are reported in Section 2.3, and Section 2.4 concludes.
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2.2 Model
The economy is populated by measure one of heterogeneous households. Households live
infinitely. Each household values consumption and leisure. Households borrow by
issuing one period non-contingent bonds, so markets are incomplete. Default is allowed.
Loans are provided by a competitive financial intermediary with an exogenous outside
option, and a transaction cost of lending.

2.2.1

Households

Households value consumption and leisure. They have different levels of debt (𝑏 < 0)
and draw different levels of productivity (𝜃) which are (partially) persistent. Households
borrow to smooth consumption and may rollover previous debt.
Default is possible in any given period. If default occurs, then the household is excluded
from borrowing for a random number of periods. Each period of exclusion, there is a
probability (𝛿) of being allowed to borrow next period. A defaulting household loses a
fraction (𝛾) of its income each period it is excluded from borrowing as in Fieldhouse et
al. (2018).
In any period, each household is endowed with one unit of productive time. The income
of a household with productivity (𝜃) supplying 𝑙 units of time as labour is 𝜃𝑙. Therefore,
the period consumption of a non-defaulting household is given by 𝑐 = 𝜃𝑙 + 𝑏 − 𝑞𝑏 ′ ,
where 𝑏 ′ is future borrowing and 𝑞 is the price of the bond. In contrast, the period
consumption of a defaulting household is given by 𝑐 = (1 − 𝛾)𝜃𝑙.
Based on the above, the value function of a household with productivity (𝜃) and debt
level (𝑏) in any period is given by 𝑉 0 (𝜃, 𝑏) as follows:
(1) 𝑉 0 (𝜃, 𝑏) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑉 𝑅 (𝜃, 𝑏), 𝑉 𝐷 (𝜃)},
where,
(2) 𝑉 𝑅 (𝜃, 𝑏) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑙,𝑏′ {𝑈(𝜃𝑙 + 𝑏 − 𝑞𝑏 ′ ) + 𝛽𝐸[𝑉 0 (𝜃′, 𝑏′)]},
(3) 𝑉 𝐷 (𝜃) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑙 {𝑈((1 − 𝛾)𝜃𝑙) + 𝛽(𝛿𝐸[𝑉 0 (𝜃′, 0)] + (1 − 𝛿)𝐸[𝑉 𝐷 (𝜃′)])}.
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𝑉 𝑅 (𝜃, 𝑏) is the value of repayment for a household with productivity (𝜃) and debt level
(𝑏) in the current period. 𝜃′ and 𝑏′ stand for future period productivity and future period
debt level respectively. 𝑉 𝐷 (𝜃) is the value of default (bankruptcy) for a household with
productivity (𝜃) in the current period.

2.2.2

Financial Intermediary

Loans are provided by a risk-neutral competitive financial intermediary. It has an outside
option with an exogenous net rate of return (𝑟). If the intermediary lends to households, it
incurs a transaction cost of lending (τ). The intermediary prices loans taking into account
τ and the probability of default in the next period, 𝑑(𝑏 ′ , 𝜃), for each household. Hence,
the price of a bond with face value (𝑏 ′ ) is given by:
𝑞(𝑏 ′ , 𝜃) = (1 − 𝜏)

[1−d(𝑏 ′ ,𝜃)]
1+𝑟

(4)

A negative financial shock is modeled as an unexpected increase in the transaction cost
(τ). As shown in equation (4), this leads to a drop in bond prices. That is, it causes a shift
in the whole bond-pricing schedule equivalent to a tightening of debt limits for all pairs
of (𝑏 ′ , 𝜃).

2.2.3

Equilibrium

Given 𝑟, τ, 𝛾, 𝛿, an equilibrium is a sequence of value functions, policy functions, default
probabilities, and bond prices that satisfy equations (1) to (4) above. The equilibrium is
characterized by the following:
•

Repayment Set, 𝑅(𝑏) = {𝜃: 𝑉 𝑅 (𝜃, 𝑏) ≥ 𝑉 𝐷 (𝜃)}.

•

Default (Bankruptcy) Set, 𝐷(𝑏) = {𝜃: 𝑉 𝑅 (𝜃, 𝑏) < 𝑉 𝐷 (𝜃)}.

•

Probability of default, 𝑑(𝑏 ′ , 𝜃).

•

Optimal borrowing policy function [𝑏 ′ (𝜃, 𝑏)].

•

Optimal labour supply policy functions [𝑙(𝜃, 𝑏)].
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2.3 Results
To solve for the model’s stationary equilibrium, I assume the following. For the utility
function, I use the following function, which is commonly used in literature.
𝑐 1−𝝈
(1 − 𝑙)1−𝜂
+𝜇
1−𝜎
1−𝜂
In addition, 𝜃 is assumed to follow an AR1 process in logs with autocorrelation
coefficient (𝜌) and standard deviation (𝜎𝜀1 ). The process is approximated by a 7-state
Markov chain. I set the values of 𝜌 and 𝜎𝜀1 to 0.967 and 0.017 respectively, as in
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017).
I assume that if a household defaults in any period, it has a 10% chance of being allowed
to borrow again the next period. This is to reflect the fact that when a household files for
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 in the US, the "bankruptcy flag" is removed in 10 years
(Chen & Zhao, 2017). Table 2-1 below shows the parameter values used.
I solve (numerically) for the model's stationary equilibrium under the following settings:
with and without default, before and after a negative shock. Before the shock, I set τ = 0.
This is meant to reflect an economy in “normal” times or before a financial crisis. In the
second case I set τ = 0.2. This increase in τ tightens borrowing limits by decreasing bond
prices for households as mentioned.
Figure 2-1 shows optimal labour supply before the shock (𝜏 = 0) and after the shock
(𝜏 = 0.2) when default is not allowed for average productivity household. As Figure 2-1
shows, when indebted households are not allowed to default, they increase their labour
supply as they face tighter debt limits. This result is in line with the result from Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2017). It is due to the negative wealth effect resulting from facing tighter
debt limits.
Figure 2-2 shows optimal labour supply after the shock (i.e. when 𝜏 = 0.2) when default
is allowed versus when it is not. When the household is allowed to default, its optimal
labour supply is lower for all levels of debt at which it defaults. As debt gets discharged
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in case of default, labour supply depends only on the level of productivity in this case.
Hence, for all levels of debt at which the household decides to default, its optimal labour
supply is the same and the line is horizontal.
For lower levels of debt (in absolute terms), the household finds it optimal to repay its
debt. This means that its optimal labour supply in that region depends on both the level of
debt and productivity. As the figure shows, the higher the debt (in absolute terms), the
higher the labour supply. Also, for levels of debt at which the household decides to repay,
the optimal labour supply is the same whether default is allowed or not since the
household is not taking the default option at these debt levels. Hence, the two lines
overlap for these debt levels.
Similar results hold for households with above and below average productivity. However,
with higher (lower) productivity households, default is optimal at higher (lower) levels of
debt (in absolute terms) relative to the average productivity household.
Table 2-1: Parameter Values

Parameter

Value

Target or Source

𝜎

2

Standard

𝜂

1.5

Standard

𝛽

0.98

Standard

𝑟

1.4%

Avg. 1-yr Real US Treasury Rate since 1986

𝛿

0.1

“bankruptcy flag” removed in 10 years

𝛾

0.319

Fieldhouse et al. (2018)

𝜌

0.967

Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017)

𝜎𝜀

0.017

Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017)
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Figure 2-1: Optimal Labour Supply Before and After a Negative Financial Shock
Default Not Allowed - Average Productivity Household

Figure 2-2: Optimal Labour Supply After a Negative Financial Shock Average Productivity Household
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Therefore, the model in this chapter predicts that the effect of default on labour supply is
negative. Households who find it optimal to default receive a positive wealth shock as
their debt gets discharged. They decrease their labour supply as a result. This is the main
result in this chapter.
Whether aggregate labour supply drops after the shock depends on whether the drop in
labour supply of households who default after the shock is big enough relative to the
increase in the labour supply of households who don’t. If this drop is larger than the
increase in labour supply for households who keep repaying, then aggregate labour
supply drops. Otherwise, aggregate labour supply increases. In addition, to capture the
full interaction between default and labour market outcomes, labour demand needs to be
added to the model. This is left for future work.

2.4 Conclusion
Following the financial crisis that started in 2007, the US economy witnessed a tightening
of lending standards, an increase in non-business bankruptcy filings, and a decrease in
hours worked. In this chapter, I study the effect of tighter debt limits on households'
labour supply decisions, and whether the effect changes with default. I find that following
a decrease in debt limits, households who find it optimal to default decrease their labour
supply. If not allowed to default, they increase their labour supply.
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Chapter 3

3

External Debt, Initial Conditions, and Economic Growth
in Low- and Middle-Income Countries

3.1 Introduction
External debt is an important source of funds for low- and middle-income countries.
Pienkowski (2017) mentions that 70% of public debt in developing countries is foreign debt.
In addition, World Bank data show that the average external debt to gross national income
almost tripled since 1970 in low- and middle-income countries.

On one hand, external debt provides an extra source of funding for economic growth
enhancing projects (like infrastructure for e.g.). On the other hand, elevated levels of
external debt means that more resources are devoted for debt service, which hinders an
economy’s ability to use these resources for more productive activities (see e.g.; Greene,
1989). This may negatively affect economic growth. It may also make obtaining more
external debt difficult if lenders view high levels of external debt as a signal of a possible
upcoming economic trouble or crisis. That being said, the question that motivates this
chapter is: what is the relationship between external debt and economic growth in lowand middle-income countries?
Empirical studies report mixed results on the relationship between external debt and
economic growth in this group of countries. A group of studies report a non-linear
relationship. That is, they find that the relationship between external debt and economic
growth in low- and middle-income countries is characterized by the existence of a
threshold, above which the relationship changes compared to when external debt is below
threshold. Other studies report a negative relationship, regardless of external debt level.
Finally, some studies find a positive relationship.
For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) find that the ratio of external debt to gross
national income is irrelevant for economic growth in low- and middle-income economies
when the ratio is below 60%. Beyond 60%, it is negatively related to economic growth.
Pattillo et al. (2011) use data from a sample of 93 low- and middle-income countries, and
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they also find a non-linear relationship between external debt and economic growth.
Shkolnyk and Koilo (2018) report a non-linear relationship as well. Zaghdoudi (2019)
reports a “threshold” as low as 15% approximately, above which external debt is found to
be negatively related to economic growth in low- and middle-income economies.
Moreover, Ehikioya et al. (2020) find a negative relationship between external debt and
economic growth in a sample of 43 African countries. Awan and Qasim (2020)
recommend the reduction of external debt as they find it is negatively related to economic
growth. Wang et al. (2021) also report a negative relationship in a different group of
countries. Kharusi and Ada (2018) find a negative relationship but conclude that external
debt can be used in a more “productive” way to contribute positively to growth.
Likewise, Dey and Tareque (2020) find a negative relationship that can be “mitigated” or
“nullified” if proper policies are put in place.
Indeed, Uzun et al. (2012) find a positive effect of external debt on economic growth in a
group of Eastern European countries in the post-Soviet era. Mohamed (2018) also reports
a positive relationship using a different sample. Similarly, Mohsin et al. (2021) find a
positive relationship between external debt and economic growth in a group of South
Asian countries.
Therefore, this sample of studies show that the relationship reported ranges from nonlinear to negative to positive. Reported results may depend on the group of countries
included in the sample. It may also depend on the time period covered.
In this chapter, I look at the external debt and economic growth relationship from a new
angle. I ask whether where an economy starts in terms of its income per capita affects the
external debt-growth relationship. The intuition is that when an economy starts at a
relatively low income per capita, it has a bigger growth potential. This means it is more
likely to benefit from the extra source of funding to finance investments that boost
economic growth.
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To that end, I first test this hypothesis empirically by estimating the parameters of growth
regression models augmented to include the external debt-to-gross national income ratio
and an interaction variable between that ratio and lagged-to-average income per capita.
When I include the external debt-to-income ratio only, its estimated coefficients are
mostly negative and/or insignificant. Similarly, when I break the sample according to an
external debt-to-income threshold, estimated coefficients are mostly insignificant. This
could lead to concluding that the external debt-growth relationship is overall negative or
insignificant.
However, when I include the interaction variable, the estimated coefficient of external
debt-to-income becomes positive and significant while the estimated coefficient of the
interaction variable is negative and significant. This supports the hypothesis that in
periods when a low- or middle-income economy starts with income per capita lower than
its long-run average, external debt is more likely to be positively related with economic
growth.
Next, I test whether a standard stochastic growth model with external borrowing can
account for this observation. To that end, I simulate the model with different levels of
initial external debt, initial output per capita and different productivity shock parameters.
This is to reflect the differences between countries in the sample used in estimating the
growth regression models. Then, I use the simulated data to estimate the external debt
and growth relationship using the same growth regression models. Simulated data
produce results in line with the results when estimating the model parameters using the
original data. That is, the estimated coefficient of external debt-to-income is positive and
significant, and the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable is negative and
significant when the growth regression model coefficients are estimated using simulated
data.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the growth regression
models and estimation results. Section 3.3 presents the stochastic growth model and
estimation results. A conclusion is provided in Section 3.4.
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3.2 Growth Regression Model Estimation
3.2.1

Benchmark Estimations

I start by estimating the parameters of the following growth regression models à la Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2003), augmented to include the ratio of external debt-to-gross
national income as an additional explanatory variable. This class of models is widely
used in the macroeconomic empirical literature on economic growth (see e.g.;
Checherita-Westphal & Rother, 2012; Woo & Kumar, 2015; Hansen, 2017):
𝑏

Model 1:

𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑦it + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

Model 2:

𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑦it + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

𝑖𝑡

𝑏

𝑖𝑡

•

𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the growth rate of GDP per capita in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡.

•

I set 𝑡 to 5 years which is the usual period used in economic growth regression
models’ estimation. So, 𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 is average growth over 5-year periods in each 𝑖.

•
•

𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡

is the external debt-to-gross national income (GNI) ratio in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡.

𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes (log) initial GDP per capita and investment-to-GDP as a benchmark.
As a robustness check, I repeat the estimation while adding a set of regressors that
are usually included in growth regression models, like government expenditure as
share of GDP, trade openness measure [(exports+imports)/GDP], and inflation.

•

𝛼𝑖 is country fixed effects, and 𝜗𝑡 is time fixed effects.

Model 1 does not account for country fixed effects and time fixed effects. Therefore,
coefficients obtained from estimating the parameters from Model 1 are pooled OLS
estimators. Pooled OLS estimators need strong assumption, “strict mean independence”,
to be consistent. In addition, if there is a correlation between 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝛼𝑖 , which is what
one would expect, then pooled OLS estimators are biased (Hansen, 2022).
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It is reasonable to assume that there is some unobserved time-invariant country-specific
characteristics (country fixed effects) and time fixed effects that affect economic growth
in the group of countries included in the sample. Model 2 accounts for such fixed effects.
Coefficients obtained from estimating the parameters from Model 2 are fixed effects (FE)
estimators.
I estimate the parameters of Model 1 and Model 2 using panel data on 35 low- and
middle-income countries (N = 35) since 1970 (T =10, given that each period is 5 years).
Countries included in the sample are shown in Appendix C. Data availability dictated the
number of countries included. Data on growth, external debt, and other variables included
in the regression models are retrieved from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators (WDI) database. The estimated coefficients are shown in the Table 3-1 and
Table 3-2 below:2
Table 3-1: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 (Model 1 and Model 2)

𝛽̂2

Pooled OLS

FE

-0.017***

-0.001

Table 3-2: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 – More Regressors (Model 1 and Model 2)

𝛽̂2

2

Pooled
OLS

FE

-0.017***

-0.001

Whenever used, *** indicates significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10% levels.
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Table 3-1 shows the estimated 𝛽2 from Model 1 and Model 2 when 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes (log)
initial GDP per capita and investment-to-GDP only. This is the benchmark 𝑋𝑖𝑡 . As
mentioned, more explanatory variables are added to 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and the estimation is repeated as
a robustness check. Table 3-2 shows the estimated 𝛽2 from Model 1 and Model 2 when
𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes additional regressors (government expenditure as share of GDP, trade
openness, and inflation.) as mentioned above. As Table 3-2 shows, estimated coefficient
and its significance do not change when more regressors are included.
In Table 3-1, the estimated coefficient is always negative albeit only the pooled OLS
estimator is significant. In Table 3-2, once again both estimates are negative and only the
coefficient estimated from Model 1 (pooled OLS) is significant.
Therefore, adding external debt-to-gross national income to a growth regression model as
an explanatory variable, and estimating Model 1 and Model 2 leads to a conclusion that
the relationship between economic growth and external debt-to-gross national income is
insignificant. If any relationship exists, then it is probably negative as per the pooled OLS
estimated coefficients. Note that adding more regressors, as shown in Table 3-2, does not
significantly change the magnitude or the significance of the estimated coefficient of
external debt-to-gross national income.
As mentioned, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) point out to the potential existence of a
“threshold” beyond which the relationship between external debt and economic growth
changes. To that end, I modify Model 1 and Model 2 to include two parameters for
external debt-to-gross national income, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3, as in Model 3 and Model 4. In Model
3 and Model 4, 𝛽2 measures the effect of external debt-to-gross national income on
economic growth when the external debt-to-income ratio is above threshold, and 𝛽3
measures the effect of external debt-to-gross national income on economic growth when
the external debt-to-income ratio is below threshold, ceteris paribus.
The threshold is chosen as the average external debt-to-gross national income in the
sample. The average external debt-to-gross national income in the sample is
approximately 49%. Out of 350 observations, 130 observations are with

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡

≥ 49% and
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𝑏

120 observations are with 𝑦it < 49%. Model 3 and Model 4 are shown below. Results are
𝑖𝑡

reported in Table 3-3 and Table 3-4.
𝑏

𝑏

Model 3:

𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑦it ≥ 49% + 𝛽3 𝑦it < 49% + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

Model 4:

𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑦it ≥ 49% + 𝛽3 𝑦it < 49% + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

𝑖𝑡

𝑏

𝑖𝑡

𝑏

𝑖𝑡

𝑖𝑡

Table 3-3: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 (Model 3 and Model 4)

Pooled OLS

FE

𝛽̂2

-0.012***

0.003

𝛽̂3

0.011

0.026**

Table 3-4: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – More Regressors (Model 3 and Model 4)
Pooled
OLS

FE

𝛽̂2

-0.012***

0.003

𝛽̂3

0.009

0.026**

Results from Tables 3-3 and 3-4 show that the relationship between economic growth and
external debt in this sample is positive below threshold. The estimated coefficient is
insignificant with pooled OLS and turns to significant when fixed effects are included. In
contrast, above threshold, the relationship is negative and significant with pooled OLS
and turns into insignificant when fixed effects are included.

52

As mentioned, I ask whether where an economy starts in terms of its income per capita
and how far it is from its long-run average affects the external debt-growth relationship.
The intuition is that when an economy starts at a relatively low income per capita, it has a
bigger growth potential. This means it is more likely to benefit from the extra source of
funding to finance investments that boost economic growth.
To test whether the starting income per capita of an economy relative to its long-run
average affects the relationship between external debt and economic growth, I estimate
the parameters of the following growth regression models, Model 5 and Model 6. Results
are reported in Table 3-5 and Table 3-6.
𝑏

Model 5:

𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑦it + 𝛽3 (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

Model 6:

𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑦it + 𝛽3 (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

•

𝑖𝑡

𝑏

𝑖𝑡

𝑏

The 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 is [𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑥 (𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑡𝑜_𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡 ].
𝑖𝑡

Table 3-5: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 (Model 5 and Model 6)
Pooled OLS

FE

𝛽̂2

0.022*

0.043***

𝛽̂3

-0.038***

-0.040***

Table 3-6: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – More Regressors (Model 5 and Model 6)
Pooled OLS

FE

𝛽̂2

0.020*

0.043***

𝛽̂3

-0.036***

-0.041***
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Table 3-7: Summary of Results (No Fixed Effects)
Explanatory Variable
𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡

-0.017

-0.017

0.022

0.020

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.011)

(0.011)

-0.038

-0.036

(0.010)

(0.010)

𝑏it
≥ 49%
𝑦𝑖𝑡

-0.012

-0.012

(0.004)

(0.004)

𝑏it
< 49%
𝑦𝑖𝑡

0.011

0.009

(0.012)

(0.012)

𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒

Log (initial real GDP)

Investment / GDP

-0.131

-0.184

-0.210

-0.264

-0.033

-0.080

(0.147)

(0.150)

(0.150)

(0.154)

(0.147)

(0.151)

0.114

0.104

0.118

0.105

0.112

0.102

(0.019)

(0.021)

(0.019)

(0.021)

(0.018)

(0.020)

Govt / GDP

Trade Openness

Inflation

FE

No

-0.097

-0.092

-0.088

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

0.009

0.010

0.008

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

-0.001

-0.001

-0.001

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

No

No

No

No

No
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Table 3-8: Summary of Results (With Fixed Effects)
Explanatory Variable
𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡

-0.001

-0.001

0.043

0.043

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.013)

(0.013)

-0.040

-0.041

(0.011)

(0.011)

𝑏it
≥ 49%
𝑦𝑖𝑡

0.003

0.003

(0.005)

(0.005)

𝑏it
< 49%
𝑦𝑖𝑡

0.026

0.026

(0.012)

(0.012)

𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒

Log (initial real GDP)

Investment / GDP

-0.433

-0.339

-0.529

-0.445

-0.358

-0.231

(0.148)

(0.178)

(0.152)

(0.181)

(0.147)

(0.177)

0.128

0.111

0.133

0.116

0.108

0.093

(0.024)

(0.026)

(0.024)

(0.026)

(0.024)

(0.026)

Govt / GDP

Trade Openness

Inflation

FE

Yes

-0.061

-0.059

-0.068

(0.037)

(0.036)

(0.036)

0.016

0.017

0.012

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.010)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Results from Tables 3-1 to 3-6 are summarized in Tables 3-7 and 3-8. The dependant
variable in all models is the 5-year average growth rate in GDP per capita. Standard

55

errors are between parentheses. A discussion of results is presented in the next
subsection. In particular, I show the implication of the estimated coefficients for the
external debt-to-gross national income and the interaction variable.

3.2.2

Discussion

Results reported in Table 3-5 and Table 3-6 show that when the interaction variable is
added to the regression models, the estimated coefficient of external debt-to-income is
always positive and significant while the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable
is always negative and significant. This supports the hypothesis that where an economy
starts in terms of income per capita matters for the external debt-growth relationship.
Table 3-9 below shows the predicted change in economic growth from a one percentage
point increase in the external debt-to-income ratio using 𝛽̂2 and 𝛽̂3 from estimating
Model 6 with t = 5 as per results reported in Table 3-6.
Table 3-9: Predicted Change in Economic Growth From 1pp increase in b/y

Lagged-to-Average GDP per Capita

𝝏𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉
𝝏(𝒃/𝒚)

0.25

0.033

0.50

0.023

0.75

0.012

1.00

0.002

1.25

-0.008

1.50

-0.019

1.75

-0.029

As the table above shows, higher lagged-to-average GDP per capita is predicted to move
the relationship between external debt-to-income and growth in GDP per capita from
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positive to negative. That is, in periods when an economy starts with income per capita
lower than its long-run average, external debt is more likely to be positively related with
economic growth and vice versa.

3.2.3

Robustness Check

I repeat the estimation of Model 5 and Model 6 using the lagged external debt-to-income
ratio. Estimated coefficients and predicted change in economic growth remain the same
qualitatively (in terms of direction) and close quantitatively (in terms of magnitude).
These results are shown in Tables 3-10 to 3-12 below.
Once again, reported results show that with the interaction variable added to the models,
the estimated coefficient of lagged external debt-to-income is always positive and
significant while the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable is always negative
and significant.
Table 3-10: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 (Lagged b/y)
Pooled OLS

FE

𝛽̂2

0.035***

0.054***

𝛽̂3

-0.045***

-0.044***

Table 3-11: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – More Regressors (Lagged b/y)
Pooled OLS

FE

𝛽̂2

0.033***

0.053***

𝛽̂3

-0.043***

-0.044***

Table 3-12 below shows the predicted change in economic growth from a one percentage
point increase in the lagged external debt-to-income ratio using
estimating Model 6 with t = 5 as per results reported in Table 3-11.

𝛽̂2 and 𝛽̂3 from
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Table 3-12: Predicted Change in growth From 1pp increase in Lagged b/y

Lagged-to-Average GDP per Capita

𝝏𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉
𝝏(𝒍𝒂𝒈𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒃/𝒚)

0.25

0.042

0.50

0.031

0.75

0.020

1.00

0.009

1.25

-0.002

1.50

-0.013

1.75

-0.024

As an additional robustness check, I repeat the estimations with t = 3, and with t = 7. As
shown in Tables 3-13 to 3-16, the same conclusion holds. 𝛽̂2 is positive and mostly
significant while 𝛽̂3 is negative and always significant, whether t = 3 or t = 7.
Table 3-13: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 (t=3)
Pooled OLS

FE

𝛽̂2

0.014

0.033***

𝛽̂3

-0.031***

-0.034***
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Table 3-14: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – More Regressors (t=3)
Pooled OLS

FE

𝛽̂2

0.017*

0.035***

𝛽̂3

-0.033***

-0.036***

Table 3-15: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 (t=7)
Pooled OLS
𝛽̂2

0.031**

𝛽̂3

-0.045***

FE
0.047***
-0.043***

Table 3-16: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – More Regressors (t=7)
Pooled OLS
𝛽̂2

0.029**

𝛽̂3

-0.043***

FE
0.049***
-0.043***

To test whether the conclusion changes with the sample, I repeat the estimation with a
different sample. As mentioned, data availability since 1970 is lacking for many low- and
middle-income countries. Some countries were not independent at that time. For
example, the former Soviet Union countries where all part of one country back then.
Therefore, in the new sample, the starting date is 1994, which is a shorter time period.
With this starting date, more low- and middle-income countries have their data available.
Therefore, the number of countries included in the new sample is 82, as opposed to 35
when the starting data is 1970 (the benchmark sample). Even with this different sample,
the conclusion holds. 𝛽̂2 is positive and significant while 𝛽̂3 is negative and significant.
Results are reported in Appendix C to save space.
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3.3 Stochastic Growth Model With External Borrowing
In this section, I test whether a standard stochastic growth model with external borrowing
can account for the observation from the previous section. I briefly describe the model
environment next. This is a standard stochastic growth model commonly used in
macroeconomic literature, augmented to include external borrowing and interest on
external debt that is a function of the level of debt.
A representative household with an infinite time horizon values consumption,
accumulates capital and can borrow internationally. The interest rate on external debt is a
function of debt as mentioned. It is reasonable to assume that as debt levels increase, the
interest rate charged on debt increases as well.
Also, the economy has a profit-maximizing representative firm. The firm has a CobbDouglas production function. Productivity is subject to exogenous shocks each period.
The social planner’s problem is as follows:
∞

𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑐𝑡,𝑙𝑡, 𝑘𝑡+1 , 𝑏𝑡+1} 𝐸0 [∑ 𝛽 𝑡 𝑈(𝑐𝑡 )]
𝑡=0

𝑠. 𝑡.

𝑐𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 𝑘𝑡 𝛼 𝑙𝑡 1−𝛼 + 𝑏𝑡+1 − [1 + 𝑟(𝑏𝑡 )]𝑏𝑡
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡
𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴𝑒 𝑧𝑡
𝐴=1
𝑧𝑡 = 𝜌𝑧 𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝜀𝑡 ~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑧 2 )
𝑐𝑡 ≥ 0 ; 0 ≤ 𝑙𝑡 ≤ 1
𝑘0 , 𝑏0 given.

∀𝑡
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3.3.1

Stochastic Growth Model Simulation

For the stochastic growth model simulations, I use the following utility function:
𝑐 1−𝝈
1−𝜎
I set 𝜎 to 2, 𝛽 to 0.96, 𝛼 to 0.36 and 𝛿 to 0.05 (all are standard).
For the interest rate function, I use the following function from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2003):
𝑟(𝑏𝑡 ) = 𝑟 + 𝛾(exp(𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏̂) − 1)
𝑟 is a base rate, assumed to equal 2%. 𝑏𝑡 is external debt level in time t. 𝑏̂ and 𝛾 are
parameters whose values are set in each simulation so that the steady state external debtto-income ratio (b/y) matches the long-run average b/y for a country from the panel data
sample used to estimate the growth regression models from the previous section.
I simulate the model 35 times, to generate a sample with the same number of countries as
in the original sample. For each simulation, I estimate 𝜌𝑧 and 𝜎𝑧 using data on output,
capital, and labour for a country in the sample. I also set 𝑘0 and 𝑏0 to match the country’s
initial conditions (output per capita and external debt-to-income). Initial A is set to 1.
Using the data generated from the stochastic growth model simulations, I estimate 𝛽̂2 and
𝛽̂3 from Model 5 and Model 6 with t = 5. The estimation yields 𝛽̂2 = 0.029 and
𝛽̂3 = -0.026 with pooled OLS and 𝛽̂2 = 0.025 and 𝛽̂3 = -0.021 with FE. All are
statistically significant. Since 𝛽̂2 is positive and significant and 𝛽̂3 is negative and
significant, this means that the predicted external debt-growth relationship using
simulated data from the stochastic growth model with external borrowing is in line with
the predicted relationship using the original (“real world”) panel data.
In Appendix C, I show the time paths of investment-to-GDP with and without external
borrowing in a simulated economy starting with GDP per capita below long-run average.
External borrowing is shown to boost investment. This is in line with the intuition that
when an economy starts at a relatively low GDP per capita, it has a bigger growth
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potential which means it is more likely to benefit from the extra source of funding to
finance investments that boost economic growth.
Table 3-17 below shows the predicted change in economic growth from one percentage
point increase in the external debt-to-income ratio implied by the estimated coefficients
from Model 6 using original data (the panel data sample) and simulated data.
Table 3-17: Predicted Change in growth From 1pp increase in b/y
Lagged-to-Average GDP per Capita

𝝏𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉
𝝏(𝒃/𝒚)

- Original

𝝏𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉
𝝏(𝒃/𝒚)

- Simulated

0.25

0.033

0.020

0.50

0.023

0.015

0.75

0.012

0.009

1.00

0.002

0.004

1.25

-0.008

-0.001

1.50

-0.019

-0.007

1.75

-0.029

-0.012

3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I look at the relationship between external debt and economic growth in
low- and middle-income countries from a new angle. I ask whether where an economy
starts in terms of its income per capita affects the external debt-growth relationship. I find
that when an economy starts below its long-run average output per capita, the relationship
is more likely to be positive and vice-versa.
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Then, I ask whether a stochastic growth model with external borrowing captures this
observation. Simulated data also show that higher lagged-to-average GDP per capita is
predicted to turn the relationship between external debt-to-income and growth in GDP
per capita from positive to negative.
Overall, this indicates that for low- and middle-income economies, in periods when they
start with output per capita lower than average, external borrowing may boost economic
growth.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Chapter 1

Impulse Response
Figures A 1 to A 3 below show the generated time paths, from the benchmark model, of
the spread between the corporate rate and interbank rate and of output in three scenarios.
In the first scenario shown in Figure A 1, there is a positive financial shock, after which
𝑍𝑡 remains above trend for many periods due to persistence. We see that as a result, the
spread is below trend and output is above trend.
In the second scenario shown in Figure A 2, there is a positive productivity shock, after
which 𝐴𝑡 remains above trend for many periods due to persistence. In contrast to the first
scenario, now both the spread and output are above trend for a number of periods.
In the third scenario shown in Figure A 3, I include a positive financial shock along with
a positive productivity shock, after which both 𝑍𝑡 and 𝐴𝑡 remain above trend for many
periods due to persistence. As in shown in Figure A 3, adding the financial shock results
in the spread being again below trend while output being above trend, which is in line
with data.

Figure A 1: Time Path of Spread and Output – Positive Financial Shock
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Figure A 2: Time Path of Spread and Output – Positive Productivity Shock

Figure A 3: Time Path of Spread and Output – Positive Productivity Shock and
Positive Financial Shock
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Benchmark Model vs. Standard RBC
Table A 1 below shows the correlations of consumption, investment, and hours worked
with GDP (in terms of deviations from trend) in data and those generated from the
benchmark simulations versus those generated from simulating a standard Real Business
Cycle (RBC) model with no financial sector. In addition, the table shows the relative
standard deviation of each variable.
As the results reported in Table A 1 show, when simulated with only productivity shocks,
the model generates statistics that are close to those generated from simulating a standard
RBC model. Adding financial shocks improves the generated business cycle statistics
relative to a standard RBC, particularly in terms of the relative volatility of hours worked.

GHH Utility Function
The goal of this section is to check whether results significantly change when using an
alternative utility function. To that end, I simulate the model using the following utility
function:
1−𝝈

1
ℎ𝑡 1+𝜂
(𝑐 − 𝜔
)
1−𝜎 𝑡
1+𝜂

With this functional form of utility, the representative household’s first order condition
now implies that:
ℎ𝑡 = (

𝑤𝑡⁄ 1⁄𝜂
𝜔)

All other equilibrium equations remain similar to the benchmark. I simulate the model
with productivity shocks only, financial shocks only, and both types of shocks, using
parameter values from Table 1-5 and the utility function above. I set 𝜔 such that the
steady state hours are equal to one third of time available. Results are reported in Tables
A 2 to A 4 below.
With this utility function, the labour supply decision and the consumption-saving
decisions are independent (Greenwood et al., 1988). Compared to the benchmark
simulation, there is in an increase in the estimated relative volatility of consumption
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which brings the estimated relative volatility of consumption closer to data. In addition,
with this utility function, when simulating the model with only financial shocks, hours
are more volatile than GDP, which is in line with data. However, the estimated relative
volatility of investment when simulating the model using this utility function is further
away from data compared to simulating the model with the benchmark utility function.
Correlations are still broadly in line with data in all simulations, except that now when
simulating the model with both shocks, the spread is positively correlated to
consumption, contrary to data. That being said, the main conclusion holds. That is, using
either utility function, adding financial shocks brings the estimated statistics closer to
data.
Table A 1: Model Simulation Results - Benchmark Model vs. RBC
Data
1986:Q1
to
2019:Q4

Benchmark:

Benchmark:

Benchmark:

Financial

Productivity

Both

Shocks

Shocks

Shocks

RBC

Standard deviation relative to GDP
Consumption

0.838

0.676

0.668

0.682

0.664

Investment

4.958

3.114

2.728

2.809

2.680

Hours worked

1.245

0.941

0.333

0.545

0.333

Consumption

0.891

0.813

0.902

0.878

0.902

Investment

0.867

0.876

0.894

0.883

0.921

Hours worked

0.873

0.920

0.745

0.697

0.814

Correlation to GDP
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Table A 2: Model Simulation Results - GHH Utility Function
Data
1986:Q1

Model with

Model with

Financial

Productivity

Shocks

Shocks

to
2019:Q4

Model with
Both Shocks

Standard deviation relative to GDP
Consumption

0.838

0.762

0.783

0.789

Investment

4.958

2.454

2.311

2.427

Hours worked

1.245

1.036

0.679

0.727

Consumption

0.891

0.913

0.934

0.910

Investment

0.867

0.879

0.858

0.841

Hours worked

0.873

0.978

0.982

0.957

Correlation to GDP

Table A 3: Rates & Spread Correlations with GDP GHH Utility Function
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

Interbank

0.497

0.111

0.060

0.051

Corporate

-0.240

-0.842

0.060

-0.092

Spread

-0.713

-0.810

0.060

-0.126

Model with
Both Shocks
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Table A 4: Spread (Corporate – Interbank) Correlations with GDP & Other
Macroeconomic Variables - GHH Utility Function
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

GDP

-0.713

-0.810

0.060

-0.126

Consumption

-0.604

-0.511

0.018

0.200

Investment

-0.702

-0.926

-0.190

-0.439

Hours Worked

-0.755

-0.907

-0.131

-0.356

Model with
Both Shocks

12m Libor and Federal Funds Rate to Estimate Financial Shocks
As mentioned, to estimate the financial shocks, as a benchmark, I assume that in any
period, 𝑍𝑡 is equal to a steady state Z multiplied by 𝑒 𝑢𝑡 , where 𝑢𝑡 follows an AR(1)
process with an i.i.d. error term 𝜀𝑡𝑢 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢2 ):
𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢 𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑢
To obtain estimates for 𝜌𝑢 and 𝜎𝑢 , I construct a time series for 𝑍𝑡 using:
𝑍𝑡 =

𝜅𝑡
1⁄
𝜆

𝜅 − 𝜉𝛾
(1 + 𝑖𝑡 ) ( 𝑡
𝜅𝑡 )

In the benchmark simulation, I jointly calibrate the steady state value of Z with 𝜉𝛾 to
target the long-run average of the real 3m Libor and long-run average of the real AAA
and BAA corporate bond rates. To construct a time series for 𝑍𝑡 , I use data on 3m Libor
and corporate bond rates. Estimated 𝜌𝑢 and 𝜎𝑢 for the benchmark simulation are 0.9611
and 0.0042 respectively.
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In this section, I repeat the exercise using two different rates as a measure of the
interbank rate. In the first, I use 12m Libor. In the second, I use the effective federal
funds rate (FF). In both cases, the financial shocks are found to be slightly less persistent.
Estimated 𝜌𝑢 using data on 12m Libor is 0.9577 and using data on FF is 0.9531. As for
volatility, financial shocks are most volatile when using FF in estimation (0.0046), and
least when using 12m Libor in estimation (0.0039).
Tables A 5 to A 7 show the results from model simulation when using 12m Libor to
estimate financial shocks, and Tables A 8 to A 10 show the results from model simulation
when using FF to estimate financial shocks. Main conclusion still holds.
Table A 5: Model Simulation Results – Using 12m Libor to Estimate Financial
Shocks
Data
1986:Q1
to
2019:Q4

Model with

Model with

Financial

Productivity

Shocks

Shocks

Model with
Both Shocks

Standard deviation relative to GDP
Consumption

0.838

0.680

0.668

0.681

Investment

4.958

3.140

2.728

2.805

Hours worked

1.245

0.951

0.333

0.521

Consumption

0.891

0.808

0.902

0.881

Investment

0.867

0.872

0.894

0.883

Hours worked

0.873

0.918

0.745

0.687

Correlation to GDP
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Table A 6: Rates & Spread Correlations with GDP - Using 12m Libor
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

Interbank

0.462

0.159

0.136

0.128

Corporate

-0.240

-0.979

0.136

-0.335

Spread

-0.709

-0.956

0.136

-0.416

Model with
Both Shocks

Table A 7: Spread (Corporate – Interbank) Correlations with GDP &
Other Macroeconomic Variables – Using 12m Libor
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

GDP

-0.709

-0.956

0.136

-0.416

Consumption

-0.606

-0.629

0.045

-0.156

Investment

-0.692

-0.897

-0.082

-0.523

Hours Worked

-0.733

-0.965

-0.235

-0.821

Model with
Both Shocks

As the reported statistics show, the main conclusion holds. With financial shocks,
whether constructed using data on 3m Libor, 12m Libor, or the effective federal funds
rate as a measure of the interbank rate, model simulation yields the right signs of the
correlations between the interbank rate, the corporate bond rate and their spread with
GDP and other macroeconomic variables. It also yields relative volatility in hours worked
closer to data and other statistics broadly in line with data.
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Table A 8: Model Simulation Results – Using FF to Estimate Financial Shocks
Data
1986:Q1

Model with

Model with

Financial

Productivity

Shocks

Shocks

to
2019:Q4

Model with
Both Shocks

Standard deviation relative to GDP
Consumption

0.838

0.684

0.668

0.681

Investment

4.958

3.179

2.728

2.830

Hours worked

1.245

0.964

0.333

0.547

Consumption

0.891

0.801

0.902

0.877

Investment

0.867

0.866

0.894

0.881

Hours worked

0.873

0.916

0.745

0.686

Correlation to GDP

Table A 9: Rates & Spread Correlations with GDP - Using FF
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

Interbank

0.485

0.160

0.136

0.126

Corporate

-0.240

-0.978

0.136

-0.368

Spread

-0.667

-0.953

0.136

-0.434

Model with
Both Shocks
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Table A 10: Spread (Corporate – Interbank) Correlations with GDP &
Other Macroeconomic Variables - Using FF
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

GDP

-0.667

-0.953

0.136

-0.434

Consumption

-0.570

-0.614

0.045

-0.163

Investment

-0.656

-0.887

-0.082

-0.540

Hours Worked

-0.687

-0.963

-0.235

-0.838

Model with
Both Shocks

Another Alternative Specification
In this section, I present an alternative specification for financial shocks in the model.
Then, I show the results from simulating the model with this alternative specification.
In this specification, I assume that 𝑍𝑡 = 𝑍 for all t. Then, rather than having a constant 𝜉,
it is now assumed to be subject to exogenous shocks each period. These are the financial
shocks in this alternative specification.
In this specification, it is assumed that 𝜉𝑡 is equal to a steady state 𝜉 multiplied by 𝑒 𝜁𝑡 ,
𝜁

where 𝜁𝑡 follows an AR(1) process with an i.i.d. error term 𝜀𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜁2 ).
𝜉𝑡 = 𝜉𝑒 𝜁𝑡 ,
𝜁

𝜁𝑡 = 𝜌𝜁 𝜁𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 .
At the beginning of each period, the shock is realized and 𝜉𝑡 is determined accordingly.
Now, the interbank borrowing constraint becomes:
𝜙𝑡 =

𝜅𝑡 − 𝜉𝑡 𝛾
𝜉𝑡 𝛾
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The interbank market clearing condition is the same as in the benchmark model, so:
𝜙𝑡
𝜅𝑡 − 𝜉𝑡 𝛾
) ⟹ 𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ ) =
𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ ) = [1 − 𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ )]𝜙𝑡 ⟹ 𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ ) = (
1 + 𝜙𝑡
𝜅𝑡
To simulate the model with this alternative specification, I use the same parameter values
and functional forms used to simulate the benchmark model (Table 1-5). The exception is
the parameter values used for financial shocks. For that, I assume that 𝛾 = 1 and set the
steady state 𝜉 (and Z) to target the long-run average of the real interbank rate (3m Libor).
1⁄
𝜆

𝜅 −𝜉 𝛾
𝜅 −𝜉 𝛾
Using 𝜇(𝜃𝑡̅ ) = 𝑡 𝜅 𝑡 and 𝜇(𝜃) = 𝜃 𝜆 , I get that 𝜃𝑡̅ = ( 𝑡 𝜅 𝑡 )
𝑡

𝑡

. I also now have that

𝜅𝑡
𝜃𝑡̅ = 𝑍(1+i
, since 𝑍𝑡 = 𝑍 for all t. Putting them together, I obtain the following (with
)
𝑡

𝛾 = 1 and 𝑍𝑡 = 𝑍):
𝜉𝑡 =

𝜅𝑡 [𝑍(1 + i𝑡 )]𝜆 − 𝜅𝑡 𝜆+1
[𝑍(1 + i𝑡 )]𝜆

Again, I use data on 3m Libor minus inflation for the gross real interbank rate (𝜅𝑡 ) and
the average of (AAA-inflation) and (BAA-inflation) for the real corporate debt rate (𝑖𝑡 ).
Using data on 𝜅𝑡 and 𝑖𝑡 with the calibrated values of 𝜆 and 𝑍, I construct a time series for
𝜉𝑡 using the above equation. Finally, I use the constructed series to estimate 𝜌𝜁 and 𝜎𝜁 .
Then, I simulate the model with the alternative specification in each case with only
financial shocks, only productivity shocks, and both types of shocks. Results are reported
in Tables A 11 to A 13 below.
As the results in Tables A 11 to A 13 below show, the main conclusion holds. Adding
financial shocks bring the generated statistics closer to data. However, modelling
financial shocks as variations in 𝑍𝑡 generates statistics that are overall closer to data than
the case of variations in 𝜉.
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Table A 11: Model Simulation Results – Variations in 𝝃
Data
1986:Q1

Model with

Model with

Financial

Productivity

Shocks

Shocks

to
2019:Q4

Model with
Both Shocks

Standard deviation relative to GDP
Consumption

0.838

0.677

0.667

0.664

Investment

4.958

3.134

2.723

2.734

Hours worked

1.245

0.953

0.335

0.340

Consumption

0.891

0.822

0.900

0.900

Investment

0.867

0.867

0.894

0.895

Hours worked

0.873

0.925

0.746

0.755

Correlation to GDP

Table A 12: Rates & Spread Correlations with GDP - Variations in 𝝃
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

Interbank

0.497

0.902

0.136

0.145

Corporate

-0.240

-0.980

0.136

0.093

Spread

-0.713

-0.952

-0.136

-0.064

Model with
Both Shocks
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Table A 13: Spread (Corporate – Interbank) Correlations with GDP &
Other Macroeconomic Variables - Variations in 𝝃
Data

Model with

Model with

1986:Q1 to

Financial

Productivity

2019:Q4

Shocks

Shocks

GDP

-0.713

-0.952

-0.136

-0.064

Consumption

-0.604

-0.657

-0.045

-0.152

Investment

-0.702

-0.854

0.083

0.015

Hours Worked

-0.755

-0.951

0.233

-0.143

Model with
Both Shocks

Business Cycle Accounting Exercise
I conduct a business cycle accounting exercise (Chari et al., 2002; Chari et al., 2007). The
goal is to show the role of different wedges in economic fluctuations. As suggested by the
authors, I use a standard neoclassical growth model and data on output, hours worked,
consumption, investment, and capital to recover four wedges: efficiency, labour,
investment, and government consumption wedges. Then, I simulate the model with one
wedge at a time and with a combination of wedges.
Table A 14 below shows the correlation of the deviations from trend of output, hours
worked, consumption, and investment from model simulations with the deviations from
trend of each variable in the data. Each row is from simulating the model with one wedge
or a combination of wedges. The numbers show that the efficiency wedge (productivity)
is the most important wedge for output fluctuations. However, adding labour and capital
(investment) wedges is important to jointly capture fluctuations in hours worked,
consumption, and investment, along with the fluctuations in GDP.
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Table A 14: Business Cycle Accounting

Wedge

Output

Hours
Worked

Consumption

Investment

Efficiency (z)

0.948

0.471

0.312

0.482

Labour (1-𝜏𝐻 )

0.322

0.668

0.135

0.191

Investment (1-𝜏𝐾 )

-0.638

-0.442

0.960

-0.149

Government

-0.222

-0.518

0.080

0.052

z, (1-𝝉𝑯 ), (1-𝝉𝑲 )

0.975

0.970

1.000

0.751
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Appendix B: Chapter 2

Non-Business Bankruptcy Filing & Hours Worked in the US (2007-2017)
The correlation between deviations from trend in non-business bankruptcy filings and
hours worked in the non-farm business sector in the US is -0.89. This is a strong negative
correlation. The figure below shows the percentage deviations from HP trend in each series
for the decade between 2007 and 2017.

Figure B 1: Percentage Deviations From Trend in Bankruptcy Filings and in Hours
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Appendix C: Chapter 3

Average External Debt to GNI and Growth in GDP per Capita Since
1970 in 35 Low- and Middle-Income Economies

Figure C 1: Average External Debt to GNI in 35 Low- and Middle-Income Countries
Since 1970

Figure C 2: Average Growth in GDP per Capita in 35 Low- and Middle-Income
Countries Since 1970
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External Borrowing Can Boost Investment
The figure below shows investment to GDP in a simulated “country” starting with GDP
per capita below its long-run average. Investment to GDP is shown from the stochastic
growth model simulation with external borrowing vs. without external borrowing. As can
be seen in Figure C 3, allowing for external borrowing boosts investment and therefore
contributes to economic growth.

Figure C 3: Investment-to-GDP With and Without External Borrowing

Growth Regression Model Estimation Results - Detailed
The tables below show the estimated coefficients from the different regression models
presented in Chapter 3. The results show that the signs of the coefficients are in line with
what is expected by theory. That is, for investment and trade the sign is positive.
In contrast, for government expenditure and inflation the sign is negative. Finally, for
initial GDP per capita, the sign is negative which is in line with conditional convergence.
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Table C 1: Estimation Results (Model 1 and Model 2 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 )

Explanatory Variable

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡

Pooled OLS

-0.017***

Log (initial real GDP)
Investment/GDP

-0.131
0.114***

FE

-0.001
-0.433***
0.128***

Table C 2: Estimation Results (Model 1 and Model 2 – More Regressors)
Pooled
OLS

FE

-0.017***

-0.001

-0.184

-0.339*

Investment / GDP

0.104***

0.111***

Govt expenditure / GDP

-0.097***

-0.061*

Trade Openness

0.009

0.016

Inflation

-0.001

-0.000

Explanatory Variable

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡
Log (initial real GDP)
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Table C 3: Estimation Results (Model 3 and Model 4 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 )

Explanatory Variable

Pooled OLS

FE

𝑏it
> 49%
𝑦𝑖𝑡

-0.012***

0.003

𝑏it
< 49%
𝑦𝑖𝑡

0.011

0.026**

Log (initial real GDP)

-0.210

-0.529***

0.118***

0.133***

Investment/GDP

Table C 4: Estimation Results (Model 3 and Model 4 – More Regressors)
Pooled
OLS

FE

𝑏it
> 49%
𝑦𝑖𝑡

-0.012***

0.003

𝑏it
< 49%
𝑦𝑖𝑡

0.009

0.026**

Log (initial real GDP)

-0.264

-0.445**

Investment / GDP

0.105***

0.116***

Govt expenditure / GDP

-0.092***

-0.059

Trade Openness

0.010*

0.017

Inflation

-0.001

-0.000

Explanatory Variable
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Table C 5: Estimation Results (Model 5 and Model 6 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 – t=5)

Explanatory Variable

Pooled OLS

FE

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡

0.022*

0.043***

𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡

-0.038***

-0.040***

Investment/GDP

0.112***

0.108***

Log (initial real GDP)

-0.033

-0.358**

Table C 6: Estimation Results (Model 5 and Model 6 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 – t=5)
Pooled
OLS

FE

0.020*

0.043***

-0.036***

-0.041***

-0.080

-0.231

Investment / GDP

0.102***

0.093***

Govt expenditure / GDP

-0.088***

-0.068*

Trade Openness

0.008

0.012

Inflation

-0.001

-0.000

Explanatory Variable

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡
Log (initial real GDP)
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Table C 7: Estimation Results (Model 5 and Model 6 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 – t=5
–Lagged b/y)

Explanatory Variable

Pooled OLS

FE

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡

0.035***

0.054***

𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡

-0.045***

-0.044***

Investment/GDP

0.112***

0.111***

Log (initial real GDP)

-0.018

-0.360**

Table C 8: Estimation Results (Model 5 and Model 6 – More Regressors – t=5
–Lagged b/y)
Pooled
OLS

FE

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡

0.033***

0.053***

𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡

-0.043***

-0.044***

-0.058

-0.242

Investment / GDP

0.106***

0.098***

Govt expenditure / GDP

-0.100***

-0.059*

Trade Openness

0.006

0.009

Inflation

-0.001

-0.000

Explanatory Variable

Log (initial real GDP)
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Table C 9: Estimation Results (Model 5 and Model 6 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 – t=3)

Explanatory Variable

Pooled OLS

FE

0.014

0.033***

𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡

-0.031***

-0.034***

Investment/GDP

0.130***

0.144***

-0.013

-0.464***

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡

Log (initial real GDP)

Table C 10: Estimation Results (Model 5 and Model 6 – More Regressors – t=3)
Pooled
OLS

FE

0.017*

0.035***

-0.033***

-0.036***

0.014

-0.346***

Investment / GDP

0.127***

0.138***

Govt expenditure / GDP

-0.087***

-0.056*

0.002

0.003

-0.003***

-0.003***

Explanatory Variable

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡
Log (initial real GDP)

Trade Openness
Inflation
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Table C 11: Estimation Results (Model 5 and Model 6 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 – t=7)

Explanatory Variable

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡
Log (initial real GDP)
Investment/GDP

Pooled OLS

FE

0.031**

0.047***

-0.045***

-0.043***

-0.117

-0.448***

0.107***

0.094***

Table C 12: Estimation Results (Model 5 and Model 6 – More Regressors – t=7)
Pooled
OLS

FE

0.029**

0.049***

-0.043***

-0.044***

-0.133

-0.344*

Investment / GDP

0.101***

0.087***

Govt expenditure / GDP

-0.076**

-0.052

Trade Openness

0.005

0.005

Inflation

-0.002

-0.002

Explanatory Variable

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡
Log (initial real GDP)
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New Sample
As mentioned, I repeat the estimation with a new sample in which the starting date is
1994 (shorter time period), so that I have five 5-year time periods. In this sample, more
countries have their data available. Therefore, the number of countries included in the
new sample is 82, as opposed to 35 when the starting data is 1970 (the benchmark
sample).
The purpose of repeating the estimation using a different sample and therefore a different
mix of countries and a different time period covered is to check whether the results and
the main conclusion are sensitive to the choice of countries included and time period
covered. Results are shown in Table C 13 and Table C 14 below (Tables C 15 and C16
present the detailed results). Results are in line with those from models’ estimation using
data from the benchmark (1970) sample. That is, even with a different mix of countries
and time period, 𝛽̂2 is positive and significant and 𝛽̂3 is negative and significant.
Table C 13: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 – Model 5 and Model 6
(New Sample)
Pooled OLS

FE

𝛽̂2

0.081***

0.091***

𝛽̂3

-0.090***

-0.090***

Table C 14: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 – More Regressors – Model 5 and Model 6
(New Sample)
Pooled OLS

FE

𝛽̂2

0.077***

0.089***

𝛽̂3

-0.087***

-0.088***
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Table C 15: Estimation Results (Model 5 and Model 6 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 –
New Sample)

Explanatory Variable

Pooled OLS

FE

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡

0.081***

0.091***

interact

-0.090***

-0.090***

-0.041

-0.129

0.129***

0.153***

Log (initial real GDP)
Investment/GDP

Table C 16: Estimation Results (Model 5 and Model 6 – More Regressors –
New Sample)
Pooled
OLS

FE

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡

0.077***

0.089***

𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡

-0.087***

-0.088***

-0.044

-0.340

Investment / GDP

0.119***

0.139***

Govt expenditure / GDP

-0.081**

0.040

Trade Openness

0.010**

0.023**

-0.001

-0.000

Explanatory Variable

Log (initial real GDP)

Inflation
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Growth Regression Model Estimation Results Using Simulated Data
The tables below show the regression estimation results along with the predicted change
in economic growth from a 1pp change in external debt-to-income when estimating
regression model parameters using the data generated from simulating the stochastic
growth model with external borrowing shown in section 3.3.
Table C 17: Estimated 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟑 Using Simulated Data (Model 5 and Model 6)
Pooled OLS

FE

𝛽̂2

0.029***

0.025***

𝛽̂3

-0.026**

-0.021*

Table C 18: Predicted Change in growth From 1pp increase in b/y
Using Estimates From Table C 17

Lagged-to-Average GDP per Capita

𝝏𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉
𝝏( 𝒃/𝒚)
-

Pooled OLS

𝝏𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉
𝝏( 𝒃/𝒚)
-

FE

0.25

0.023

0.020

0.50

0.016

0.015

0.75

0.010

0.009

1.00

0.003

0.004

1.25

-0.004

-0.001

1.50

-0.010

-0.007

1.75

-0.017

-0.012
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Table C 19: Estimation Results (Model 5 and Model 6 – Benchmark 𝑿𝒊𝒕 –
Simulated Data)

Explanatory Variable

Pooled OLS

FE

𝑏it
𝑦𝑖𝑡

0.029***

0.025***

interact

-0.026**

-0.021*

Log (initial real GDP)

-4.548***

-2.942***

Investment/GDP

0.158***

0.095***
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